Sarajevo Redux: Socio-Spatial Outcomes and the Perpetuation of Fragility in a Post-Conflict City

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Berlin, 1st of February 2019
Statement of authenticity of material

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any institution and to the best of my knowledge and belief, the research contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text of the thesis.

James D. Schmitt
Berlin, 1 February 2019
Abstract

In an increasingly urbanized world, new constructs concerning urban fragility, the changed nature and increasing urbanization of armed conflict and emerging conceptual frameworks for urban post-conflict interventions present new discourses for urban planners and post-conflict first responders to consider. Cities with the highest level of fragility tend to be in states destabilized by ongoing intrastate conflict and yet even after negotiated peace settlements recovering cities appear particularly vulnerable to the accumulation of urban risks and tensions associated with higher levels of urban fragility. Working as part of an international post-conflict intervention recovery effort, how can urban planners contribute to achieving better long-term outcomes of peace and stability in the urban post-conflict setting?

By conducting a macro and meso level case study analysis of Sarajevo's international post-conflict intervention through the lens of the social contract, liberal peace, and collective memory theoretical frameworks, this thesis seeks to identify strategic approaches and outcomes of Sarajevo's post-conflict intervention process and the related long-term impacts of these outcomes at the municipal and neighborhood scale. More than two decades after the end of armed conflict, the greater Sarajevo metropolitan area remains peaceful, yet partitioned; social, yet segregated; and, functional, yet fragile. Though limited by the contextualized nature of urban post-conflict settings, this analysis might be useful for other urban post-conflict situations.

Drawing from the results of the case study analysis, as well as from other relevant literature sources and related professional field experiences, this thesis hypothesizes that the early integration of urban planners with initial humanitarian and stabilization first responders as part of international post-conflict intervention recovery efforts can result in better long-term outcomes of peace and stability.

Keywords: Urban Post-Conflict Recovery, Urban Planning, Urban Peacebuilding, Collective Memory, Social Contract, Urban Post-Conflict Intervention, Fragile City
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To my wife, Rebecca, whose commitment to justice and human rights inspires me today and every day.
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<tr>
<td>ALNAP</td>
<td>Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action</td>
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<td>ANSA</td>
<td>Armed non-State Actor</td>
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<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>Dayton Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>EYOF</td>
<td>European Youth Olympic Festival</td>
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<td>FBiH</td>
<td>Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>GAUC</td>
<td>Global Alliance for Urban Crises</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IEBL</td>
<td>Inter-Entity Border Line</td>
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<td>IIED</td>
<td>International Institute for Environment and Development</td>
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<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHR</td>
<td>Office of High Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCRC</td>
<td>Post-conflict Research Center</td>
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<td>PRRP</td>
<td>Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Republika Srpska</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>VRS</td>
<td>Bosnian Serb Army</td>
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Sarajevo Redux: Socio-Spatial Outcomes and the Perpetuation of Fragility in a Post-Conflict City

1 INTRODUCTION

We are together, but not together.
I am not afraid of the return of war, but I am not optimistic about progress.

Journalist, East Sarajevo, 2018

Sarajevo was the one thing we won.

Senior Official 1994 -1998, Federal Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 2018

As the fighting in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Libya already indicates, the principal battlegrounds of the future are not going to be in open terrain. They are going to be in towns and cities.

Sir Anthony Beevor, British Historian, 2018

1.1 Problem Statement and Hypothesis

In 2015 a newly developed framework allowed urban planners and other researchers to empirically measure the level of city's fragility over the concentration and accumulation of urban risk factors across eleven categories (Igarapé Institute 2015, n.p.). The results, while perhaps not surprising, were certainly concerning: eight of the top ten most fragile cities in the world with populations over 250,000 were located in the Middle East and North Africa region (Muggah 2017, n.p), a region profoundly impacted by on-going intrastate armed conflict – "conflicts within one state rather than between two or more states" (Blin 2011, p. 289) – in several states to this day. Cities located in areas destabilized by state and regional armed conflict, it seemed, were at significant risk for high levels of urban fragility.

It was not only cities with recent exposure to direct or regional armed conflict that seemed at risk. Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and Monrovia, Liberia, two cities each recovering from their civil war or intrastate armed conflict from as long as two decades ago, were still, even now, evaluated as highly fragile. Based on the Igarapé Institute's findings, both short- and long-
term urban fragility outcomes seemed distinctly possible for post-conflict cities affected by intrastate armed conflict.

The accumulation of a number of multidimensional risk factors fosters increased tension in the city. Urban fragility results when these tensions combine with a municipality's low capacity to deliver on their part of the “Social Contract” - the ability of the state to provide "security, welfare, and legitimate representation" (Muggah 2013, n.p.). Too much fragility and urban settings are highly vulnerable to instability and crisis (as in the urban environment of New Orleans in Post-Hurricane Katrina), whereas Oslo, with comparatively low urban tensions and high governance capacity, is a very stable city with a low vulnerability for conflict.

Additionally, new empirical research on armed conflict shows that from 2007 to 2017 the number of major intrastate conflicts – those involving at least 1000 battle deaths per year – has almost tripled (Einsiedel et al 2017, p.2). The nature of armed conflict has changed, and intrastate armed conflict now predominates and occurs in far greater numbers than any other form of state-based armed conflict (Allanson et al 2017, p. 576), with the number of conflicts involving non-state armed actors (such as ISIS in Iraq and Syria or Al-Shabaab in East Africa) having increased from 62 in 2016 to 82 in 2017 alone (Dupoy and Rustad 2018, p. 2). Often these intrastate conflicts, such as is in Syria and Yemen, manifest in urban environments (ICRC 2016, p. 218) where outcomes are particularly devastating to local society.

The scale of people directly affected by increasing urban conflict is also significant. In 2018, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimates that "fifty million people are currently bearing the brunt of war in cities around the world" (2018b, n.p.). One only has to look at the example of the Islamic State's (ISIS) focused attacks and subsequent destructive battles for cities in Iraq and Syria (Almukhtar et al 2017, n.p.), and the continuing conflict in both countries as a manifestation of the changed nature of armed conflict.

These new discourses have not gone unnoticed by relevant stakeholder communities. For example, international humanitarian and stabilization actors are now adjusting urban post-conflict response methodologies, moving from a target or sector-based approach to a more "holistic" area-based approach (Campbell 2016 p. 39) by focusing on the needs of a given geography, such as an urban neighborhood or district.

Likewise, urban planners are responding to these new concerns with new initiatives and academic programming related to urban planning's role in urban post-conflict recovery as shown by the Columbia University Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation’s (Columbia GSAPP) establishment in December 2018 of a Post-Conflict Cities Lab that will "particularly focus on post-conflict urban planning" (Columbia University 2018, n.p.). This is a welcome development as other urban scholars have previously concluded that "divorced from
the conflict realm, urban planning is not treated as a priority area pertaining to conflict" (Sucuoğlu et al 2017, p.12).

At the same time, calls for new forms of strategic governance frameworks for international post-conflict response interventions frameworks have been put forward by several post-conflict scholars (Barakat and Zyck 2009, p. 1081; Lamphere-Englund 2015, p. 31; Sampaio 2016, p. 86). In an urban post-conflict setting, such a framework could foster more integrated and holistic responses from different humanitarian and stabilization actors, to include the early inclusion and integration of urban planners, a group that has not traditionally been involved in initial stage post-conflict interventions.

Given new discourses concerning urban fragility, the changed nature and urbanization of armed conflict and emerging urban post-conflict response frameworks for post-conflict interventions, how can urban planners contribute to achieving better long-term outcomes of peace and stability in the urban post-conflict setting?

To address this question, this thesis conducts a macro and meso case study analysis of Sarajevo, a post-conflict city still characterized as fragile (Igarapé Institute 2015, n.p.). The post-conflict approaches and outcomes of the 1992 to 1996 siege of Sarajevo provide a useful example of an international post-conflict intervention in the urban setting. The intrastate conflict which affected Sarajevo was an early prototype of the changed nature of armed conflict present today (Bădescu 2014, pg. 2): a mix of internationalized intrastate war, domestic, as well as foreign actors, contested sovereignty, state militaries, paramilitaries, non-state armed actors and transnational criminal networks.

Drawing from the results of the case study analysis, as well as from other relevant literature sources and related professional field experiences, this thesis hypothesizes that the early integration of urban planners with initial humanitarian and stabilization first responders as part of international post-conflict intervention recovery efforts can result in better long-term outcomes of peace and stability.

1.2 Motivation and Background

My first awareness of the need to better integrate urban planning with initial urban post-conflict recovery efforts occurred in central Baghdad during the Winter of 2003/2004, not yet one year after the invasion and occupation by a U.S.-led military coalition. As a civilian contractor supporting a ministry of the new Iraqi government, I transited the city from one secured "safe zone" to another to meet with my Iraqi counterparts either at their pre-war offices across town or in the new working location at the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in the "green zone" compound, a fortified area in central Baghdad heavily secured by coalition military forces as well as private security companies.
The city was also a partitioned space of "go" and "no go" areas for the average resident of Baghdad. Local residents could not freely enter secured areas and would wait hours in long queues to present required passes and identification to enter, an activity that became increasingly perilous to do as the security situation worsened with a growing backlash insurgency. As a civilian, I would also traverse the entry control points that partitioned the city, leaving one "gated community" in one Baghdad neighborhood to travel to another as needed. However, the adverse impacts of this barrier approach were also clear to me: by sequestering into secured compounds, the coalition had effectively separated itself from local residents and vice versa.

Later on, over most of the next decade, I would go to visit other post-conflict or post-crisis settings – Herat, Monrovia, Kandahar, Kabul, New Orleans, Basra – as part of my work in post-conflict or crisis intervention stabilization programs. I saw the impacts when recovery was approached from a combined approach of inclusive social and economic recovery, infrastructure reconstruction or upgrade, and institutional capacity (such as local governance and security) and when it was not. Though each city functioned in distinctly different contexts, in each case the same lesson was reinforced: lasting solutions are inclusive local solutions.

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS, LITERATURE REVIEW AND URBAN CONCEPTS

In this chapter, I will contextualize theoretical and conceptual factors that frame the challenges and emerging opportunities for addressing urban fragility in the post-conflict city. Starting with the theoretical lens used to view Sarajevo’s post-conflict recovery, I will present the relevance of this theoretical framework to the post-conflict setting. The chapter will then build upon this framework by conducting a literature review to highlight new dimensions and challenges associated with urban fragility and post-conflict cities, to include how armed conflict itself has changed and why this matters so much to cities in fragile settings. Finally, I will end this chapter with new urban concepts associated with the changing nature and opportunities of urban post-conflict response, to include a newly recognized need to increase early coordination and linkages between urban planners and urban post-conflict humanitarian and stabilization first responders and calls for a more strategic governance framework to coordinate urban post-conflict recovery efforts.

2.1 Theoretical Frameworks

2.1.1 Liberal Peace Theory

Roland Paris argues that post-conflict interventions which primarily adopt a "liberal peace" model of rapid political and economic liberalization strategy in fragile settings (such as in Sarajevo) run the risk of producing "destabilizing side effects that worked against the
consolidation of peace" rather than the providing the solutions for conflict as intended (Paris 2004, p.151). His analysis of some post-Cold War peacebuilding interventions, to include Bosnia-Herzegovina, show that in the short term, aggressive political and economic liberalization strategies can worsen conflict instead of tempering it. This concept is further validated through the analysis of Sarajevo’s post-conflict recovery approach.

2.1.2 Social Contract Theory and Urban Fragility (Rousseau and Muggah)

Rousseau's social contract theory argues that human beings became civilized by relinquishing some personal freedoms to the government which, in turn, provides the "order, structure, protection and services" that cannot be obtained as individuals (Charlesworth and Fien 2014, p. 199).

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) view of the social contract framework in fragile settings builds on Muggah (see section 2.1) and Rousseau's arguments but is even more explicit, arguing that the social contract in the post-conflict setting must be rebuilt through the promotion of responsive local institutions, inclusive political systems "based on transparent and predictable mechanisms that include and engage individuals or social groupings commonly marginalized or wholly excluded from political life" and fostering resilient societies "by promoting robust state–society and society–society relations" (2016, p. 7).

The UNDP further deepens this framework by highlighting the complementing role of the social covenant (a "horizontal" process that brings together various ethnic, religious, clan, and ideological groups within a political community") in establishing the social contract in a fractured state (UNDP 2016, p. 10). In many ways, and as the thesis will show later in the macro and meso analysis of Sarajevo in Chapter 5, the post-conflict outcomes of Sarajevo fall short in each concept.

2.1.3 Collective Memory Theory (Halbwachs)

In the 1950s, Maurice Halbwachs argued that there is not only individual memory but also group memory presented by family or social groups that is established and functions outside of the individual. This "collective memory" of the group thus shapes an individual's understanding of the past (Halbwachs, translated by Coser, 1992, p.38) and influences current perspectives. This thesis utilizes this framework in the Sarajevo post-conflict context to argue that identity group memorials of the past reinforce division in the present through objects equated with separate ethnonational positions.

2.2 Framing Urban Fragility and Contextualizing the Post-Conflict Setting

Fragility is now conventionally recognized as manifesting at both state and city levels and is it
considered equally as important to address fragility at both levels (OECD 2018, p. 32). Accordingly, analytical research is increasingly focused on identifying and addressing the drivers of fragility and instability in the urban setting. From this perspective, and for this research, I build on the framework established by Robert Muggah to contextualize urban fragility in the urban post-conflict setting of Sarajevo to investigate if the outcomes of Sarajevo's post-conflict recovery intervention have contributed to perpetuating urban fragility in that city. From Muggah's standpoint, Sarajevo is the one highly fragile post-conflict city of Europe (2015, n.p.). As a post-conflict city, it is essential to understand the linkages, if any, between the outcomes of post-conflict intervention strategies from 23 years ago and the ascribed urban fragility of today. Additionally, by identifying such linkages, we can better identify specific urban post-conflict recovery approaches for further research, evaluation and potential revision in light of these outcomes and other external contributing factors to increased armed conflict in cities. As a first step, however, it is necessary to examine current literature and concepts on what constitutes a fragile city.

Building from the earliest social contract concepts created by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Robert Muggah's framework combines social contract theory with the concept that accumulated multidimensional risk factors can foster tension in an urban environment, particularly in low-income settings (2013, n.p.), that can result in increased urban fragility. These urban risk factors might include high population growth (especially a "youth bulge"), being located in a fragile or conflict country, unplanned and rapid urbanization, concentrated poverty, income inequality, high unemployment, access to services, violent crimes, environmental fragility, terrorism, and the percentage of press references to conflict (2015, n.p).

In Muggah's framework, these stresses, combined with the local capacity of municipalities to deliver on the social contract - the ability of the state to provide "security, welfare, and legitimate representation" can create a combination which results in urban fragility. When applying this framework to the post-conflict setting of Sarajevo, Muggah's organization concludes that Sarajevo is a fragile city based on the pressures of several of the above risk factors including high unemployment, environmental fragility, and the institutional weaknesses that preclude the municipal governance structure from honoring its side of the social contract (Muggah 2015, n.p.).

2.2.1 The Multidimensional Drivers of Urban Fragility

Building on Muggah's framework, a review of current literature demonstrates that urban fragility is perceived as multidimensional and multifaceted (Muggah 2015, p. 32; Kilcullen 2018, n.p; OECD 2018, pgs. 32 -36). As shown by the OECD's interdisciplinary fragility framework, urban fragility is also multidimensional and is a "manifestation of convergence of multiple stresses" (OECD 2018, p.32).

The OECD supports Muggah's argument that when multiple urban stresses accumulate too much, they may diminish the "legitimacy of the social contract that binds urban authorities and citizens"
(Muggah 2015 p. 33). Likewise, the OECD suggests that these stresses could include a combination of dynamics beyond the usual framing of fragility as a condition driven by conflict, withering economic growth, or weak institutional capacity (OECD 2018, p.28). Instead, urban fragility is multifaceted and driven by a number of contextually specific drivers which, when taken together, accumulate to make it difficult for states or municipal authorities to fulfill their side of the social contract.

Other specialists argue that additional risk factors for urban fragility include a lack of shared trust or "the perceived view that the government is not looking out for the people's interests" (Interview with GIZ Official, 20 September 2018), or in a fragmented society based on different ethnonational identities (OECD 2018, p. 42).

However, as scholars Charlesworth and Fein point out, "indeed, although an ethnically-mixed population is a logical prerequisite for ethnic partition, there are many cities around the world, such as Bombay, Phnom Penh, Mombasa, Kuala Lumpur, Kumasi, Bangalore and Kinshasa, where rival ethnic groups manage to cooperate and cohabit quite peacefully. Why, then, do some cities end up divided by physical partitions while others do not?" (2006, p. 7)

Furthermore, does partitioning among identity groups in an urban setting contribute to urban fragility? This thesis will argue that the evidence shows that entrenched or de facto permanent partitioning among ethnonational identity does contribute to perpetuating urban fragility as defined above.

2.2.2 The Increasing Number of Fragile Cities

It is also important to note that there are some macro drivers which suggest that the number of fragile cities in the world will increase by 2030.

For example, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) assesses that:

- The population of every single country in Africa, Asia and Latin America where USAID has a Mission or presence is migrating to cities.
- Cities will account for the majority of those who earn less than $1 a day in 2040.
- An estimated 180,000 people move into cities each day.
- Urban areas are expected to gain 1.4 billion people between 2011 and 2030.

USAID 2013, p. 3

A separate OECD estimate concludes that "without action, 80% of the world's poorest will be living in fragile contexts by 2030" (2018 p.7), often in urban settings as the world continues to urbanize at a rapid rate (UN DESA 2018 n.p.). Additionally, it is not only demographic pressures
caused by rapid urbanization that fosters urban tensions and challenges the capacities of municipal governance. It is the changing nature of armed conflict itself – and the persistence of armed non-state actors – which can lead to additional urban tension, as presented in the next chapter.

2.2.3 Distinction Between “Post-Conflict” and “Fragile Cities”

With the wide acknowledgment of rapid urbanization in the 21st century and new projections for the increase in the number of fragile cities, the perceived negative consequences of the "fragile city" is increasingly receiving critical attention and debate among scholars and international aid practitioners (Miklos and Paoliello 2017, p.551-552).

According to Muggah (2014, p.1) and as previously defined, fragile cities are cities that "exhibit declining governance abilities and/or willingness to deliver on the social contract" and are often viewed in terms of the city's inability to provide for the necessary security and monopoly of force, the rule of law, justice, livelihood opportunities, and public service needs of its residents.

However, not all fragile cities are post-conflict cities. For example, there are highly fragile cities in Central America that have rates of violence and crime driven by armed non-state actors and criminal networks (see section 2.2.6). Even so, Miklos and Paoliello (2017 p. 552) further argue that the fragile city "could be identified as a source of local, national, regional, and global insecurity" consequently becoming relevant to the international community "as a new frontier in the measures of international intervention."

From this perspective, then, there are many examples of post-conflict fragile cities experiencing or transitioning from an intrastate conflict involving armed non-state actors (ANSAs) (including Mogadishu, Juba, Monrovia, Kandahar, Sana'a, Aleppo and Mosul, among many others, that are in the proximity of regional conflict).

Fragile cities, particularly in low-income categories, are also being viewed by some scholars as the template for tomorrow's armed conflict if we are to accept their rationale concerning rising risks related to rapid urbanization and crowded cities, failing governance structures, transnational criminal networks, intrastate armed conflict and socio-economic pressures during the 21st century (Kilcullen 2013, p. 51; Sampaio 2016, p. 74; Norton 2003, p. 9).

Moreover, post-conflict cities that have endured intrastate armed conflict tend to have some distinct characteristics. Given the increased number of intrastate armed conflicts, this is an important point. According to Sakalasuriya et al, "the post-conflict context is unique and different from a non-conflict context" (2018, p. 899). The post-conflict context is defined by a
mix of "failed state conditions, negative peace, the presence of military forces, vulnerable communities, post-war tension, poverty, displacement, corruption, and the existence of war economies" (ibid.).

According to the OECD, in the post-conflict context, "social divisions and weak institutions" are the norm and "society tends to be fractured into various groups that are often based on ethnic, religious, clan, or other identity" (OECD 2018, p. 42). These groups may be antagonistic towards each other or, as in the case of Sarajevo, previously involved in outright armed conflict against each other. The OECD argues that how these identity groups cooperate, and work together horizontally have a key effect on how vertical state-society social contracts develop (ibid., p. 42). In this type of situation where trust is absent, fragility "rises or declines with the ability of such groups to work together" (ibid., p. 42).

2.2.4 Post-Conflict Cities and International Interventions

While the prospect of increased future conflict in fragile cities continues to be under examination and debate, the likelihood of additional post-conflict peace operations in post-conflict locations appears more established.

Currently, the United Nations conducts 14 peacekeeping operations around the world, of which 7 are primarily operating in, or from, urban settings (United Nations 2018, n.p) and by 2030 this number is expected to increase until the majority of UN peacekeeping missions are conducted in states that "are largely urban" (Bosetti et al 2016, p. 2).

However, while international post-conflict interventions can be expected to continue, the "liberal peace" approach frequently utilized in such interventions since 1989 will require adjustment for the urban setting. Defined by Newman, Paris, and Richmond (2010) as "the promotion of democracy, market-based economic reforms and a range of other institutions associated with "modern" states as a driving force for building "peace", some scholars feel it is not an appropriate approach for urban post-conflict settings. For example, Björkdahl argues that the liberal peace approach is not sufficiently geared for post-conflict cities "whereby the urban conditions the construction, maintenance or resistance to peace" (Björkdahl 2014, p.1).

In the post-conflict city, international interventions often contend with heterogeneous populations with little to no common identity, contested space down to and between neighborhood levels, infrastructure decay or destruction, degraded or minimal levels of municipal administration and services, influential informal power structures, and high levels of entrenched unemployment and poverty (Graham 2010, pgs. 20, 56; USA Today 2005, n.p.)

Cities transitioning from intrastate conflict are particularly challenged by underlying sources of historical tensions and the highly contextualized nature of post-conflict urban environments.
Accordingly, new conceptual frameworks for post-conflict recovery interventions, more attuned to understanding the contextual nuances of increased density, diversity, complexities, quantities and opportunities of the urban space (ODI 2018, n.p; Sakalasuriya et al 2018, p. 899), are thus needed to understand the potential positive and negative outcomes associated with urban post-conflict recovery interventions.

### 2.2.5 Emerging Post-Conflict Conceptual Frameworks

One such conceptual framework for understanding the post-conflict context, as well as the potential consequences of post-conflict recovery interventions, has recently been proposed by post-conflict reconstruction experts who argue that post-conflict reconstruction "typically entails rebuilding soft and hard infrastructure…(and) the overall reconstruction strategy takes a holistic approach and considers the linkages among these interventions" (Sakalasuriya et al 2018, p. 894).

While a small number of additions to Sakalasuriya et al's (2018, p. 894) framework may better address urban specific factors of the urban dimension, such as the likely presence of private sector actors, existing social networks, and formal and informal neighborhood-level local governance structures, frameworks such as this (see Figure 2-1) provide an integrating mechanism for the different stakeholders involved in the initial urban post-conflict intervention and could be readily incorporated as part of a more comprehensive strategic governance framework to coordinate urban post-conflict interventions.

Sakalasuriya et al (2018 p. 893) further argue that potential outcomes or consequences of international post-conflict reconstruction interventions should be considered from a local environmental, social, political, and economic perspective, an approach this thesis utilizes in the meso level analysis of Sarajevo's post-conflict recovery outcomes.
2.3 Framing the Changed Nature of Armed Conflict

The changed nature of armed conflict, now more population focused, identity-based, and referenced as "new wars" by some scholars (Kaldor 2013, p. 2; Blin 2011, p. 287), arose at the end of the 20th century after the end of the cold war and creates additional risks to fragile cities, particularly to fragile cities in regions experiencing intrastate armed conflict.

In this era of so-called "new wars" of which the siege of Sarajevo is an early example (Bădescu 2014, pg. 2), armed conflict has continued to shift from state on state or interstate war to internal intrastate or civil war. The urban scholars, Charlesworth and Fien, cite Leitenberg's findings that "since World War II there has been a marked shift from inter - to intra-state conflict with 41 million deaths, 80 percent of which were caused by someone of their own nationality (2006, p.6). Furthermore, other urban scholars maintain that "fragile cities and their urban peripheries" will be the site of even more wars in the future (Muggah 2012, p. vi). However, looking closer, this changed nature of armed conflict is more than just the transition to intrastate conflict and urban centers. As this thesis will highlight, the changed nature of armed conflict also includes new facets of conflict persistency (Callimachi 2019, n.p.), increased risks for conflict relapse (Einsiedel et al 2017, p. 2), internationalization (OECD 2018, p. 28), the use of non-state armed
actors such paramilitary groups, private security, and transnational criminal networks (Aitkenhead 2017, n.p.), and a changed focus from ideological to group identity and population (Kaldor 2013, p. 2).

The 1992 to 1996 siege of Sarajevo, an early portent of new wars, showcases a protracted intrastate conflict fought on terms of ethnonational identity and conducted through the use of non-state armed actors, paramilitaries, internationalized support, multilateral actors, and regular militaries. Rather than manifesting as interstate conflict, new wars are fought more in the name of identity and are population focused (Kaldor 2013, p. 2), making this framework particularly relevant to urban population centers with weak governance capacity in areas of regional or state conflict. The multitude of actors involved in new wars has specific implications for post-conflict recovery in a city. For example, one former senior official from the Bosnian-Herzegovinian government at the time of the Sarajevo siege (author interview, 7 NOV 2018) suggested that United Nations actions throughout the siege were never about needs of the residents but always about political bargains with the respective actors.

Other aspects associated with new wars and the changed nature of conflict relevant to urban post-conflict planners are as follows:

2.3.1 The Rise of Intrastate Conflict

Intrastate armed conflict currently occurs in far higher numbers than any other form of state-based armed conflict (Allanson et al 2017, p. 576). Often these civil wars manifest in urban environments where outcomes are particularly devastating to local society (as discussed in section 1.1).

2.3.2 Population Centric: What happens Outside the City can Directly Impact What Happens Inside the City

Urban post-conflict interventions must also take into account considerations that extend far beyond a city's boundaries given that what happens to a population group outside the city can directly impact its members or associates inside the city. Population flows, and demographic linkages based on identity group networks, occur both in and out of the city. What happens in one part of the identity network located outside the city, can directly impact the part of the network located inside the city. For example, members of one ethnic clan from a remote rural area in a region may dominate a particular service function or activity in a recovering post-conflict city such as water delivery. Urban post-conflict planners must therefore maintain a current contextual understanding of demographic linkages occurring far outside traditional urban boundaries.
2.3.3 The Persistence of Conflict, “You Have the Watches, But They Have the Time”

Though ANSAs may be forced to abandon a city as a result of opposing military action, it does not mean that ANSA group is defeated. New evidence shows that armed non-state actors adjust their tactics and objectives for persistent conflict. A recent article by the New York Times describes this deliberate and planned transformation from municipal governance and administration back to guerilla fighting in the case of the Islamic State and the city of Mosul where "ISIS began the transition back to an insurgency as far back as 2016, a full year before it lost the most important center under its control — the Iraqi city of Mosul" (Callimachi 2019, n.p.)

Conflict historian Blin in his assessment of the future of armed conflict and ANSAs projects that "guerrilla warfare, in new forms and following new taxonomic schemes, is very likely to become the most common type of armed conflict in the coming decades" (2011, p. 310) and that "the dynamics of guerrilla warfare systematically rely on a fundamental axis that constitutes the conflict's primary interest, and which eventually becomes its hostage: the people" (ibid.).

The characteristics of ANSAs' adaptability, persistence and focus to local population exemplified my own experiences when I was the program director for an Afghanistan community led-stabilization program from 2009 to 2011. To understand the local ANSA context, I was told, I needed to remember only one thing, "you may have the watches, but they have the time."

2.3.4 The High Potential for Conflict Reversion in Intrastate Conflict

Another significant factor related to the long-term risks of armed conflict is that cities recovering from intrastate conflict are inherently fragile and have a high possibility of armed conflict relapse. According to the United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, "60% of (intrastate) conflict in the early 2000s relapsed within five years" (Einsiedel et al 2017, p. 2).

Furthermore, World Bank analysis shows "that 90 percent of the last decade's civil wars occurred in countries that had already had a civil war in the last 30 years" (World Bank 2011, p. 2) and other estimates show that "nearly half of all civil wars are due to post-conflict relapses" (Collier et al 2008, p. 2). In other words, given that armed conflict is increasingly associated with cities "where governance and institutional mechanisms are already fragile" (Sampaio 2018, n.p.) when internal armed conflict does occur, there is a strong possibility that it will reoccur in the future.

2.3.5 The Internationalization of Intrastate Conflict

The OECD points out in their 2018 Fragile States Report, that of the 47 documented civil wars in 2016, 18 (38%) were internationalized or supported by outside states with troops. When outside
powers unilaterally take sides in civil wars, peace resolution measures at the regional or international level can break down further, thus protracting the conflict (OECD 2018, p. 28). Additionally, internationalized support can channel more destructive weaponry and greater resources, providing the means prolong a more violent war. Compounding this concern, the OECD projects that urban conflict is increasing and will continue to do so (OECD 2016, p. 51).

2.3.6 The Increase of Non-State Armed Conflict

It is not only intrastate armed conflict that is rapidly increasing. So, too, is armed conflict associated with criminal gangs and networks, armed insurgency groups, and inter and intra-religious group violence. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program defines non-state conflict as "the use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year" (2018, n.p.). Per Figure 2.1, 2017 had the highest number of such armed conflicts since the end of the cold war (Pettersson and Eck 2018, p. 538). The implications for fragile cities with weak governance capacity or post-conflict cities recovering from conflict against the violence of ANSAs are concerning given the social contract implications of a local municipal government's inability to maintain a monopoly of force and the assurance of safety and security for its residents.
One could also add the undermining nature of transnational criminal networks on governance structures, as seen in the drug trafficking wars in the Americas (Londoño 2018, n.p.), or the destabilizing effect of a regional conflict with ANSAs as recently shown in the Islamic States’ focus and occupation of numerous cities in Iraq and Syria (Almukhtar et al 2017 n.p).

2.3.7 The Move of Armed Conflict to the City: Implications for Post-Conflict Recovery Interventions

With the changed nature of armed conflict, and with rapidly rising urbanization rates in fragile counties, by 2030 "the majority of countries currently hosting UN peacekeeping missions will be largely urban" (Bosetti et al 2016, n.p.).

Some professional organizations frame the move of armed conflict to the city even more acutely. According to the International Society of City and Regional Planners, "today's wars are fought primarily in and over cities since to control the city means to control the country in terms of government, economy and cultural trade" (2015, n.p.). Another illustrative example is Mogadishu, a fragile city recently featured in a New York Times opinion editorial. According to
the author, and similar to other recent viewpoints concerning the move of armed conflict to the urban space, the first lesson to be taken from the Mogadishu conflict is that today's "contemporary battlefield is more likely to be urban and congested rather than wide open and sparsely populated" (Bacevich 2018, p. A32).

When cities are confronted with state or regional conflict, they are at increased risk for tipping into armed conflict themselves. This was recently exemplified in the Middle East region with the rise of the Islamic State (IS), an armed non-state actor that developed from a mostly rural-based insurgency in Iraq formed after the 2003 U.S. invasion to a dominant force and governance structure in numerous cities across Iraq and Syria (Schmitt 2018, n.p.). Taking advantage of the chaos and instability of the 2011 uprising in Syria and the resultant higher levels of fragility of cities under the stress of intrastate conflict, the IS was able to establish itself across large areas in Iraq and Syria. By initially working with rebel forces against the Syrian government, they had "amassed hundreds of followers from dozens of countries and were running training camps near of Aleppo" by late 2012 (Taub 2018, p.58). By 2014, the IS was targeting towns and cities to continue its expansion and, by 2017, their control had expanded to nearly 10 million people (BBC 2018, n.p.) – a population comprised of individuals mostly located in towns and cities situated across Iraq and Syria (Almukhtar et al 2017, n.p).

Still, post-conflict urban space, at its most basic, is where physical infrastructure, institutions (including public security and peacekeeping), local markets, essential services, local governance, livelihoods, degrees of informality, recreation, schools, and the social fabric of society meet and negotiate in everyday existence. In earlier urban post-conflict interventions where a strong overarching political consensus existed, such as in Sarajevo in 1996, the international community focused on physical infrastructure reconstruction and service restoration and the application of the "liberal peace" approach.

The liberal peace approached the centralized market and political liberalism as the prime strategy for urban post-conflict reconstruction and has been shown to be insufficient or even counter-productive in fragile settings with weak institutions (Paris 2004, p. 151; Barakat and Zyck 2009, p. 1083).

Now, new urban post-conflict response intervention strategies call for a more locally-integrated process with improved strategic governance for planning and implementation (Barakat and Zyck 2009, p. 1081; Lamphere-Englund 2015, p. 31; Sampaio 2016, p. 86) that goes beyond earlier approaches of physical reconstruction and service restoration combined with "liberal peace" reconstruction methodologies promoted in the initial post-cold war era.
2.4 Framing the Changing Nature of Urban Post-Conflict Response

With few exceptions (NATO arguably being one of them) international post-conflict intervention mechanisms are traditionally assembled as needed and on a crisis-driven basis. ("For each crisis, a hasty and ad hoc response is assembled" (United Nations 2015, p. 13)). Essential questions related to the composition, funding, and national, regional, and international intersections of authority are outside the scope of this research. That being said, there are significant practical and operational level challenges related to the integration of post-conflict humanitarian and stabilization first responders and urban planners. Each of these groups tends to function in separate "mission zones" with different objectives, priorities, and timelines. In the past, some urban planning practitioners even felt "that the field of urban planning has been slow to acknowledge post-conflict scenarios as part of its repertoire" (Calame and Charlesworth 2009, p 168).

Urban humanitarian and stabilization first responders start with the "as is" situation on the ground and must quickly, and demonstrably, address humanitarian, security, basic infrastructure, economic activity, local governance and other stabilization needs in short order. Generally, they operate along a guideline that prioritizes the ability to assess and address local needs quickly, in a necessary process exemplifying the Voltaire adage "don't let perfect become the enemy of good." On the other hand, urban planners involved in post-conflict recovery tend to conceptualize and operate from a more long-term, idealized, urban recovery and development perspective – one that is further removed from the quick-impact approaches of their humanitarian and stabilization counterparts.

While this dichotomy may have sufficiently worked for cities in past eras of state-on-state interstate armed conflict recovery (think 20th century post-conflict urban recovery), the increasing number of cities of impacted by armed intrastate conflict in the 21st century, and the multi-discipline response it requires, call for earlier and more frequent connections between urban planners and humanitarian and stabilization first responders. To that end, new strategic coordination mechanisms, such as the Global Alliance for Urban Crises (GAUC), are needed to link urban post-crisis responders together.

2.4.1 Increasing Linkages and Coordination Among Urban Post-Conflict Intervention Stakeholders

The 2016 creation of the Global Alliance for Urban Crises (GAUC), a multi-stakeholder initiative which provides an interdisciplinary forum for urban and humanitarian actors, is one example of new linkages facilitating multidisciplinary dialogue and approach development. This effort also created a "response roster" (GAUC 2018, n.p.) which specifically features technical roles not traditionally considered humanitarian first responders, to include development and urban specialists. Underscoring this development, and the changing nature of humanitarian post-
conflict response approaches is recently published literature from humanitarian scholars stating that "humanitarians need to better understand the existing urban systems and their interlinkages (Archer and Dodman 2017, p. 340).

Additionally, urban humanitarian response scholars have also recently identified the importance of finding opportunities for integrating and linking humanitarian responses "with important issues facing city residents and governments" as a way to generate better "far-reaching" urban outcomes (Archer and Dodman 2017 p. 346).

Still, in an urban post-conflict environment, to achieve better outcomes urban planners need to be involved earlier. However, great care must also be taken with integrating post-conflict urban planning into overall recovery efforts, as socio-spatial outcomes can contribute positively or negatively to a post-conflict city's ability to establish sustainable peace, reconciliation and stability among its residents (Bollens 2006, p. 130).

Furthermore, in post-conflict interventions, there is always the danger that "certain urban spatial configurations can increase the possibility of urban conflict tipping into violence" (Moser and Rogers 2012, p. 18). With that said, by working together with other humanitarian and stabilization first responders, as well as local community members and other stakeholders, urban planners can foster the development of locally-inclusive and contextually appropriate approaches that positively influence socio-spatial development.

2.4.1.1 Humanitarian

In urban conflicts, most of the people killed are civilians who have no role or part in the conflict other than trying to survive (ICRC 2018a, n.p.). It is also widely recognized that post-conflict recovery approaches for more densely populated heterogeneous and intermixed urban settings require different approaches than ones utilized in camps, rural areas or villages (Brown and Johnson 2015, p. 339).

New efforts from the international humanitarian community are therefore increasingly focused on the humanitarian response to urban crisis, including responding to conflict in cities (Brown and Johnson 2015, p. 1). This new focus appears driven by a recognition of some of the same urban risk factors captured in Muggah's urban fragility framework, as well as some additional ones:

- rapid urbanization, urban density, income inequality (Brown and Johnson 2015, p. 2);
- the increase of armed conflict in cities and the complications of post-conflict recovery efforts (ICRC 2016, p. 218); and,
• the self-acknowledgment that having traditionally responded to crises in rural settings and refugee camps, humanitarian response actors were not prepared "to deal with the realities of urban contexts" (Campbell 2016, p. 6).

2.4.1.2 Stabilization

Stabilization activities are particularly well-suited for supporting local community-led initiatives in local governance, livelihoods and the restoration of primary municipal functions and services at the neighborhood level in post-conflict cities. According to a 2018 report on post-conflict stabilization by the RAND organization, the UNDP was leading the stabilization efforts for Iraq in response to ISIS and, as of January 2018, had conducted more than 1,600 projects in "23 areas of Iraq, facilitating the return of more than 2.2 million Iraqis to their homes, by rehabilitating vital infrastructure in areas of water, health, and education and by assisting municipal functions and providing cash for work and other livelihood opportunities" (Robinson et al. 2018, p. 29).

Stabilization first responder activities are generally geared to a "bottom-up" approach with a strong focus on supporting community-led efforts and therefore could provide a critical resource and technical role in the initial stages of urban post-conflict interventions.

2.4.1.3 Urban Planning

*Spatial Looking at conflicts from a spatial perspective through inclusive architecture and urban planning provides an interesting opportunity for finding answers outside of the peacebuilding toolbox. Spatial perspectives can shape the urban fabric, buildings and spaces, but also open up new developmental opportunities, support and develop livelihoods and foster collective identities, the sense of belonging and cohesion in communities.*

Sucuoglu et al 2017, p.17

2.4.2 Emerging Strategic Governance Frameworks and New Approaches

A more substantial inclusion of "tactical" urban planners in initial, rather than later, stages of urban post-conflict recovery interventions might directly contribute to the development of better socio-spatial planning strategies that help set the positive conditions for follow-on community-led stability and development programming to succeed. Such activities might include identifying and engaging with local urban planners and neighborhood leaders to foster conflict mitigation and peacebuilding through community-led quick impact neighborhood improvement programs, the establishment of intergroup mixing and micro-linkages through the re/creation of "common
ground" public space in areas with diverse urban populations, quick-impact grassroots economic activity, community-led local governance councils and social recovery program placement.

At the same time, and working at the municipal policy level, the early integration of "strategic level" urban planners might help foster locally inclusive urban planning practices, the development of local urban planning institutional capacity, and the integrated planning and coordination across sectors to address physical, institutional and social post-conflict recovery priorities. As post-conflict planning specialist Scott Bollens points out, "what urban policies can do, however, and it is significant, is to create physical and psychological spaces that can co-contribute to, and actualize, political stability and co-existence in cities" (2014, n.p.).

Nonetheless, while urban planning is increasingly recognized as a necessary component for urban post-conflict recovery and growth (Lamphere-Englund 2015, p. 31; Calame and Charlesworth 2009, p. 167) perhaps it had been neglected in the past or functioned too late in the urban post-conflict recovery process. Changing this possible perception is also necessary and requires greater integration with other post-conflict first response actors in the field and further empirical research and literature on urban post-conflict interventions in cities subjected to intrastate conflict in a "new wars" (Kaldor 2013, pgs. 2-3) context.

2.4.2.1 Recognizing the Need to Understand Local Contexts

The post-conflict city has specific dimensions which differentiate it from other post-conflict interventions in rural settings (ODI 2018, n.p):

- The diversity of individuals and neighborhoods
- The density of neighborhoods
- The spatial complexity
- The quantity of space
- The opportunities of existing and potential capacities

The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) makes the case that there is an increasing recognition of the need for ‘context relevant' humanitarian responses in urban areas (Campbell 2018 p.7) given the urban dimension and that understanding local context improves urban response efforts "by informing and improving programming, building on what already exists in the urban environment, and having a holistic, and ideally shared, view of what's happening and how things are interconnected" (ibid. p. 17).
ALNAP’s model for understanding local urban context consists of six interconnected areas (see Figure 2.1) and was developed to help guide practitioners due, in part, to the realization that in complex urban settings, particularly conflict situations, the manner by humanitarian response is conducted can potentially create harm, despite best intentions (ibid., p.19). Moreover, Archer and Dodman, in a related point, assert that given the “complexity and distinctiveness” of each urban setting, the application of humanitarian principles “must be strongly informed by a deep understanding of the local context (2017, p. 341).

2.4.2.2 Viewing the City as a Set of Interdependent Systems

In addition to having interconnected contexts, cities operate as a set of interdependent systems, resulting in uncertainty and quick changes. Post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding interventions must approach them as such (Schmitt 2018, n.p.).

For example: If a city's hydroelectric dam and primary water source have been destroyed and water treatment and distribution capacity are halted, primary day-to-day survival tasks are significantly impacted: cooking, cleaning, eating and water intake. How do you go to work or school, or conduct any recovery activity if you have to spend a morning going to a water distribution point? Likewise, if a city’s road and path networks have been mined and have yet to be cleared, it now takes 3 hours to get to work rather than 30 minutes.

The importance of viewing cities across sectors and scales is now being emphasized in both research and practitioner circle as shown by this recent assessment from Brown and Johnson, “most research on urban crisis and humanitarian response have failed to look across sectors (e.g.,
water, sanitation, shelter) and scales (individual, household, neighborhood, district, and city-wide). This has hindered understanding of interconnections within urban systems, how a crisis may result in cascading failures, and which communities are most affected and why" (2015, p. 2).

2.4.2.3 Taking an “Area-Based” Approach, Rather Than Focusing Solely on a Target Sector or Population

New area-based approaches developed by humanitarian stakeholders which address post-crisis relief and recovery needs also have strong applicability for the urban post-conflict setting and offer more integrated and locally-inclusive holistic recovery approaches across different sectors and urban scales (neighborhood, district, municipal). For cities recovering from intrastate armed conflict, community-inclusive assessment teams could identify social and economic recovery needs in addition to physical infrastructure and institutional requirements (such as local governance and community-led planning). A recent publication from the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) provides 10 overarching principals for implementing area-based approaches (ABAs) in urban areas impacted by “rapid-onset” natural disasters (Sanderson and Sitko 2017, p. 2).

IIED’s ten principles for enacting post-disaster urban ABAs (Sanderson and Sitko 2017, p. 2):

1. Multi-agency, multi-sector participatory assessments
2. Focus on location
3. Realistic timeframes
4. People-centred actions – whose reality counts?
5. Work with existing structures
6. Collaborating sectors and programmes
7. Flexible programming: adaptive management
8. Nimble internal systems
9. Plan for scaling-up, and
10. Measure contribution not attribution.

2.4.2.4 Adapting to “The Golden Hour” Concept

When communities are traumatized by violent conflict, quick response stabilization professionals use a concept taken from the medical community: "The Golden Hour" (Stephenson 2007, n.p.). In the "golden hour" concept, when a human being is traumatized by considerable violence, their chance of recovery is dramatically increased if they receive medical attention during those first crucial minutes after the trauma. In the "golden hour" perhaps the bleeding is stopped, the shock is stabilized, or the heart begins beating again, and the chance for life and recovery is best realized (ibid.) In this sense, cities and their neighborhoods affected by armed conflict trauma are also living organism with acute needs and essential requirements which must also be addressed quickly if chances for recovery are to be maximized (Schmitt 2018, n.p.).
2.4.2.5 Investing in Inclusionary “Co-Production” Recovery Efforts with Local Residents

"All too often, the emergency nature of humanitarian responses encourages an expert-led or engineering approach rather than allowing the time to develop an understanding of local needs and capacities" (Archer and Dodman 2017, p. 340).

In post-conflict stabilization settings, post-conflict scholars have emphasized the necessity of inclusive approaches involving local leadership and resident participation for achieving sustainable peace and stability (Mendelson and Danan 2015, p 42). Likewise, humanitarian scholars have suggested a similar approach for urban crisis settings by highlighting the increased need for "local participation in co-production and review of knowledge" (Brown and Johnson 2015, p. 4).

From 2008 to 2012, I served as the vice president and senior director for the stabilization and development division of a large USAID implementing partner. Focusing on community-led initiatives was a cornerstone of our approach for post-conflict environments, and through these efforts, I learned from many very experienced stabilization practitioners. Top among these learning points was the concept and value of co-production recovery efforts in mitigating local conflict. Specific guidance points relevant to community-led, co-production activities included:

1. Communities, themselves, can best determine their own needs;
2. Community projects empower individuals;
3. Small projects have great impact;
4. Common efforts mitigate conflict; and,
5. The local footprint sets the path.

2.4.2.6 Social Recovery and the Creation of Social Capital Through “small step” Linkages Between Polarized Communities

In post-conflict cities, war traumatized residents require social recovery support as much as physical and institutional recovery. Post-conflict social recovery both within and among polarized identity groups takes times and often involves many precursor activities such as:

- Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programming where ex-combatants are brought back into society through activities which might include counseling, skills training, livelihoods support, and micro-financing for entrepreneurial initiatives;
• Restorative and transitional justice (so that individuals are held accountable for their crimes committed during the conflict, not entire communities or groups);
• Social reconciliation activities (so that the “other,” and perceived former opposer, is recognized as a person and individual rather than as a collective);
• Economic livelihoods support through cash for work programs, intergroup business incubator initiatives, micro-loans, and seed capital;
• Interfaith dialogue focused on bridgebuilding and peacemaking sponsored through local religious institutions; and
• Inclusionary cultural and shared heritage facilities such as museums, galleries and music.

According to the OECD, social capital is defined as "networks together with shared norms, values, and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups" (OECD 2018, p. 45). By focusing on creating the longer-term conditions necessary to foster the development of social capital networks inside and among different identity groups, the city can foster better intergroup horizontal linkages which, in turn, have been shown to strengthen the social contact through better vertical linkages between residents and municipal authorities (OECD 2018, p. 42).

The World Bank’s Linking, Bridging, Bonding Framework focuses on promoting the development of social capital (OECD 2018, p. 45):

- ** Bonding:** Efforts within like-minded communities to strengthen social ties, promote self-help approaches, share information and assets, pool funds, and provide psycho-social support.
- **Bridging:** Efforts to bring together different communities with fewer shared interests to maximize capacities in the face of shocks and stress and to mend divisions that can lead to conflict."
- **Linking:** Efforts to connect communities and local networks with formal institutions and governments to access services, share information, and strengthen trust and responsive action in the face of crisis.

Source: OECD 2018, p. 45

2.4.2.7 **Anticipating the Presence of Private Sector Service Providers in Post-Conflict/Crisis Situations**

When cities are unable to honor their side of the social contract, urban fragility can quickly deteriorate into the breakdown of formal municipal structures and services and even violence as shown by the events in New Orleans in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in September 2005 (USA Today 2005, n.p.), a result I experienced first-hand after arriving there on September 2nd 2005 as an employee a global private security firm based in the Washington,
D.C. area, to manage the security and crisis response requirements for a large local Fortune 500 engineering and services company awarded an initial up-to-$100 million contract by the federal government to provide hurricane recovery support in New Orleans and the surrounding area (Shaw Group 2005, n.p). The scale of the crisis was significant and received a significant level of pledged international assistance - $854 million (Solomon and Hue 2007, p.1).

When observed through the aperture of Muggah's urban fragility framework, pre-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans had numerous urban risks. New Orleans' urban stress factors in 2005 included high levels of concentrated poverty, high levels of income inequality, a segregated populace, and extremely high unemployment in poor neighborhoods where only 60 percent of working-age residents were employed (Katz 2006, n.p.) In Orleans Parish (where much of the city of New Orleans is located) poverty rate was 23.2 percent, the seventh highest of 290 large U.S. counties (ibid., 2006, n.p.). Municipal institutions were unable to endure the shock of a Category 5 hurricane and were unable to provide for the security and welfare for many of the city's most vulnerable residents, such as the poor or elderly, and the city reached the tipping point from fragility to a complete breakdown of local governance.

Given these extreme local conditions - a complete breakdown of essential municipal services, the absence of the rule of law, and the direct, but unmet, humanitarian needs of thousands of residents – it is perhaps not so surprising that the federal government delegated a significant recovery role to the private sector. For nearly 90 days I worked throughout the city during the initial days of recovery. Upon my return to Washington, D.C., I was asked to develop and present key considerations for quick response providers for cities recovering from traumatic crisis (Schmitt 2006, n.p.). These considerations are listed in Annex F.

Many outside actors supported the initial recovery of New Orleans after the hurricane. The sheer magnitude of the disaster, and the resultant physical and traumatic social impact on the overwhelmed city and surrounding area necessitated an extensive recovery intervention from outside sources, to include private sector providers. In the 21st century, international urban post-conflict interventions should anticipate, and plan, for their presence on the ground in any possible setting. As Barakat and Zyck conclude, "in the post-2001 period, predominantly Western companies are increasingly becoming the face of post-conflict recovery" (2009, p. 1078).

2.5 The Literature Gap

Several scholars have noted that post-conflict reconstruction “lacks a strong and cohesive theory” (Barakat and Zyck 2009, p. 1080; Hasic 2004, p. ix) although other findings link post-conflict recovery and stability to the reestablishment of the social contract (World Bank 2018, p. 42; Addison and Murshed 2001, p. 11; Muggah 2017, n.p.)
International post-conflict interventions in urban settings is a complex topic with many related impacting factors and additional time and research are required to more fully develop urban post-conflict recovery approaches (see Section 3.4, Significance of Research, for suggested follow-on research and analytical topics).

While a growing literature addresses the concepts of armed conflict linked to rising urbanization, the growing economic, security and governance instability of so-called future "feral cities" (Norton 2003, p. 101), and the related "increasing vulnerability of urban centres to armed conflict" (Sampaio 2016, p.76), there is far less literature related to the research and understanding of outcomes of urban post-conflict recovery interventions in cities subjected to intrastate conflict in a "new wars" (Kaldor 2013, pgs. 2-3) context.

Additionally, while more recent evidence shows this is changing (International Society of City and Regional Planners 2015, n.p.), earlier literature has concluded "that the field of urban planning has been slow to acknowledge post-conflict scenarios as part of its repertoire" (Calame and Charlesworth 2009, p. 168).

3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES, DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, I will first explain the objectives and significance of this thesis, as well as present the general and specific questions this thesis seeks to answer. Next, the chapter presents the research design and case study methodology, describing how field data and secondary source data was collected. Finally, this chapter also identifies research limitations as well as suggestions for additional follow-on research related to the research topic of urban post-conflict recovery.

3.1 Research Objectives

Given new discourses concerning urban fragility, the changed nature and urbanization of armed conflict and emerging urban post-conflict response frameworks for post-conflict interventions, this thesis seeks to understand how urban planners working as part of an international post-conflict intervention effort can contribute to achieving better long-term outcomes of peace and stability in the urban post-conflict setting.

To accomplish this, I conduct a macro and meso level case study analysis of Sarajevo’s international post-conflict intervention approaches and outcomes through the lens of the social contract, liberal peace, and collective memory theoretical frameworks in order to identify the long-term impacts of these approaches and outcomes at the municipal and neighborhood scale.
Drawing from the results of the case study analysis, as well as from other relevant literature sources, and related professional field experiences, this thesis hypothesizes that the early integration of urban planners with initial humanitarian and stabilization first responders as part of international post-conflict interventions can result in better long-term outcomes of peace and stability.

3.2 Research Questions

**General Research Question**

- Working as part of an international post-conflict intervention effort, how can urban planners contribute to achieving better long-term outcomes of peace and stability in the urban post-conflict setting?

**Specific Research Questions**

- Which of Sarajevo’s post-conflict reconstruction methods and approaches might inform other current or future urban post-conflict intervention efforts?
- Do current socio-spatial conditions in East Sarajevo and Sarajevo perpetuate urban fragility in the greater Sarajevo metropolitan area?

3.3 Significance of Research

Achieving better outcomes from international urban post-conflict interventions, particularly for cities in areas with persistent conflict, is becoming increasingly crucial for minimizing conflict relapse or long-term urban fragility. This thesis seeks to contribute to this effort by:

- Providing analysis, findings and conclusions related to current long-term outcomes of Sarajevo’s post-conflict recovery approach and developing findings and conclusions which might be useful for other urban post-conflict interventions.
- Acting as a starting point for additional discussion and research on a more integrated urban post-conflict strategic governance framework, to include the use and integration of urban planning technical expertise, a technical skill not frequently integrated with urban post-conflict humanitarian and stabilization response efforts.
- Facilitating the expansion of the theoretical basis of urban post-conflict recovery by promoting the gathering of additional empirical data from other recent urban
armed conflicts (for example, but not limited to, Sana'a, Mosul, Raqqa, and Abidjan).

- Serving as reference for additional research related to urban planning mechanisms, technical approaches, and hybrid-team configurations for responding to urban conflict on a first response basis (as part of initial urban post-conflict humanitarian or stabilization efforts).

3.4 Research Design

In addition to secondary research conducted through a document and literature review, the research plan utilizes primary research conducted through structured and semi-structured interviews and participant observation at field research sites. The thesis draws upon a case study of Sarajevo, a post-conflict city recovering from intrastate conflict, by:

- Conducting a macro level analysis through the lens of the social contract, liberal peace, and collective memory theoretical frameworks to identify key characteristics of Sarajevo’s post-conflict recovery approach which might be useful for other cities currently in, or transitioning from, intrastate conflict and violence, namely:

  o The post-conflict partitioning of Sarajevo into East Sarajevo and Sarajevo.
  o Post-conflict population resettlement.
  o Rapid political and market liberalization.
  o A focus on physical reconstruction.

- Conducting a meso level analysis through the lens of the social contract, liberal peace, and collective memory theoretical frameworks to identify local long-term socio-spatial impacts related to Sarajevo’s post-conflict recovery approaches and outcomes, and their potential contributions to perpetuating urban fragility in the everyday, namely through:

  o Analysis of physical and environmental (socio-spatial), social (intergroup linkages), political/governance, and economic factors at the municipal scale (East Sarajevo and Sarajevo).
  o Analysis of physical (socio-spatial), political/governance, and economic factors at the neighborhood scale (border areas of the neighborhoods of Lukavica (City of East Sarajevo) and Dobrinja (City of Sarajevo).
• Developing conclusions and recommendations drawn from the case study analysis and findings, as well as related academic literature and documentation, post-conflict and fragile setting technical specialists, and direct practitioner experiences obtained in other post-conflict cities.

The analytical starting point for my definition of urban fragility utilizes Muggah’s concept for urban fragility (Muggah 2013, n.p.).

3.5 Data Collection Methodology

3.5.1 Interviews

As part of the research plan for this thesis, I conducted a combination of 39 semi-structured and structured formal interviews throughout September to December 2018 in Bonn, Berlin, and Sarajevo. Of the 39 interviews, eight were via Skype and 31 were conducted in face to face meetings.

The 39 interviews are divided into the following three research categories:

• **Nine technical specialist interviews** consisting of semi-structured interviews with senior technical specialists from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) on the concept of fragility in post-conflict settings;

• **Fourteen local key informant interviews** conducted in Sarajevo consisting of semi-structured interviews with senior current or former government officials at the municipal or national level, senior multilateral (UN and OSCE) officials, a senior religious leader, academic specialists, and senior civil society officials;

• **Sixteen local resident interviews** conducted in the greater Sarajevo metropolitan area consisting of structured interviews with a gender-balanced mix of residents from both East Sarajevo (7) and Sarajevo (9).

In deference to the fact that many individuals are currently serving in positions of authority and responsibly, and to encourage forthright and direct responses given the sensitive and personal nature of the topic, I have anonymized the identities of all interviewees. There are two exceptions to this: the current mayor of East New Sarajevo, Mr. Ljubiša Ćosic, mayor since 2012 and the former mayor of Sarajevo, Prof. Dr. Tarik Kupusović, mayor from March 1994 to February 1996.

Both Prof. Dr. Kupusović and Mr. Ćosic agreed to direct attribution of their responses to my questions. As an outcome of the Dayton Peace Agreement partitioning, the jurisdictions of Sarajevo and East Sarajevo are physically adjacent to each other and I concentrated on the
Dobrinja, Sarajevo and Lukavica, East Sarajevo neighborhood areas along the 'soft' border separating the two communities. Local key informant interviews were conducted throughout Sarajevo and East Sarajevo depending on the location of interviewee offices or work locations.

Interviews were conducted primarily, but not exclusively, in English. Three interviews required the use of a translator.

While the Office of the Mayor of the City of East New Sarajevo agreed to have Mayor Ćosić participate in an interview for this thesis, the Office of the Mayor of the City of Sarajevo was not responsive to numerous requests for an interview. Fortunately, important perspective was provided by the former mayor of the City of Sarajevo, Prof. Dr. Tarik Kupusović.

3.5.1.1 Technical Specialist Interviews

By interviewing technical specialists with experience as international cooperation field practitioners in fragile settings I was able to gain technical background on the complexities of assessing and addressing fragility in complex environments. The information I received from respondents served as the foundational knowledge for research and provided me with the concepts and background information useful for framing and conducting later field interviews and research in Sarajevo. The practical experience of the GIZ technical specialists I engaged with was extensive and included individuals that were currently managing programs in fragile setting, to include post-conflict cities, and those that are now providing thought leadership and technical development for current and future programming at GIZ headquarters. These interviews were also conducted as part of my academic internship with GIZ. Given the wide placement of the GIZ staff in program positions both in and outside of Germany, all but two of the nine interviews were conducted via Skype.

**Technical Specialist Interviews focused on three knowledge objectives:**

- To understand how fragility in post-conflict cities is conceptualized;
- To understand the complexities of analyzing and addressing fragility in post-conflict cities; and,
- To understand the role of local institutions in addressing fragility in post-conflict cities.

3.5.1.2 Local Key Informant Interviews

All 14 key informant interviews took place in the field as part of my field research in Sarajevo conducted from September 2018 to mid-November 2018 with one final key informant interview
taking place in Berlin in December 2018. Interviews were initially facilitated by Ambassador Hrle, the current Bosnia-Herzegovinian Ambassador to the United States, who provided me with introductions to several former and current senior government officials involved with Sarajevo’s post-conflict recovery. Other initial interviews included officials with the Organisation for the Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), local academics, local civil society representatives and post-conflict researchers. Through these initial key introductions and interviews (and through their assistance) I was able to utilize the snowball effect to interview other key individuals to include former and current mayors, diplomats, aid workers and other senior individuals directly connected by position, responsibility, or academic focus to Sarajevo’s post-conflict recovery.

Local key informant interviews focused on the following knowledge objectives (within the specific context of Sarajevo’s post-conflict experience).

- Identifying how integrated urban planning can reduce fragility and facilitate peacebuilding in cities transitioning from armed conflict; specifically,
- Did urban planning contribute to social recovery processes in the post-conflict city?
- Was urban planning reflected and integrated into other aspects of international post-conflict reconstruction/recovery intervention efforts?
- How were local needs, considerations and contexts taken into account when designing and implementing urban post-conflict recovery strategies?
- Looking back, how did this work in the immediate post-conflict Sarajevo context?
- What, if anything, might have been done differently for Sarajevo on the part of the international post-conflict recovery intervention?

Additional questions were also developed and presented to specific municipal, religious, academic, and diplomatic officials in line with the functions of their position at the time. For example, when I interviewed an Iman in Sarajevo, I was very interested in knowing more about the role that interfaith dialogue played in peacebuilding within the post-conflict city.

**Municipal-Level Interview Topics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial Post-Conflict Reconstruction Priorities and Objectives of Sarajevo / East Sarajevo</th>
<th>Current Urban Priorities to Include Planning and Interactions with the “Other” City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Type of analysis to determine and assess the needs of the residents for a transition to peace and post-conflict recovery</td>
<td>• Level of cooperation between East Sarajevo and Sarajevo Local Municipal Administrations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.5.1.3 Local Resident Interviews

I specifically focused on younger individuals who were too young to participate in the conflict (though at a very young age they indeed might have been victimized by it) in order to gain more focused insight related to the socio-spatial outcomes of armed conflict, rather than the siege of Sarajevo itself.

In this regard, and for these structured interviews (questions and responses are listed in Annex C), I focused on understanding how the socio-spatial outcomes of the post-conflict partition impacted residents on both sides of the urban border in the everyday.

Firstly, I wanted to understand if the impacts of these socio-spatial outcomes created everyday urban tensions or barriers for East Sarajevo or Sarajevo residents to negotiate when engaging with the other, and if so, how this tension was manifested.

Secondly, I wanted to gain understanding on whether the post-conflict partitioning of the Sarajevo neighborhood of Dobrinja into two different adjacent communities (Sarajevo and East Sarajevo) influenced how the other from across the border line was perceived and if so, did this perception equate to further reinforcement of separateness and division.

Local individual resident interviews were conducted in public settings within the interviewees’ home city of either East Sarajevo, a city populated mainly Bosnian Serb residents, or Sarajevo, the adjacent larger city mainly populated by Bosniak residents. Interviews generally lasted from 30 minutes to 50 minutes and all were conducted in English with the exception of two interviews.
in the Lukavica neighborhood (East Sarajevo) where I used a translator provided by the Post-Conflict Research Center (PCRC) to provide simultaneous interpretation.

Participating individuals were selected based on the following guidelines:

- A primary residency in East Sarajevo or Sarajevo.
- A balanced mix between both population groups.
- Gender inclusiveness.
- Are under the age of 30 (in the end two were not). The purpose for this that I wanted to local residents that had grown up in the post-conflict period and understood the Sarajevo urban setting from that contextualization point.
- A willingness to participate in an academic study and were willing to provide direct and forthright responses with the conditions that all responses would be kept confidential and listed anonymously.

For each local resident interview, I developed questions along two paths of discussion. The first five questions related to participant’s purpose and means of interaction with the “other” city – the reasons for going there, the frequency of going there, and the methods of going there. In this way I hoped to gain insight on the degree and type of individual interaction with the other city across the “border” and to what affect the border had on the participants level of interaction. For example, does the partition equate to adverse impacts to gaining access to the other city because there are increased mobility challenges? The second five questions related to how the participant perceived the “other” city from a comparative perspective, how they relate to it individually, and the degree of relevance they ascribe to it. For example, how comfortable did the interviewee feel in the “other” city? Did they feel that there were places that they could not go in the “other” city because of their identity? (See Annex C for individual questions and Annex D for individual anonymized responses.)

My objective with the questions was to gain a better understanding of the long-term outcomes of Sarajevo’s post-conflict partition in the everyday. Did it even matter that the partition had even occurred and was it, for all practical intents and purposes, irrelevant to the members of the different identity group communities? Alternatively, would responses speak to a sustained division, a lack of social capital, and an enduring separateness between the local identity group communities?

The question of individual ethnonational identity and place remains a sensitive topic in Sarajevo. After explaining the purpose of my research and how their direct feedback would contribute to it, however, all participants were willing to engage with me. Nonetheless, as an outsider, it was also helpful to work in partnership with a local NGO, the PCRC, to establish the essential initial trust with participants from both communities.
### Local Resident Interview Topics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose and Means of Interaction with the “Other” City</th>
<th>Perception of the “Other” City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Everyday social linkages (cultural, educational, and sport) between residents of East Sarajevo and Sarajevo</td>
<td>• Perceived level of cooperation between the East Sarajevo and Sarajevo local municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Everyday economic linkages between residents of East Sarajevo and Sarajevo</td>
<td>• Perception of cultural memorials and symbology in East Sarajevo and Sarajevo; perceived impact on residents’ self-identity (monocultural; pancultural; collective memory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Everyday cooperation and interaction between residents of East Sarajevo and Sarajevo</td>
<td>• Perceived vulnerability to further deepening of ethnonational divisions between residents of East Sarajevo and Sarajevo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Perceived vulnerability to further deepening of ethnonational divisions between residents of East Sarajevo and Sarajevo</td>
<td>• Perceived opportunities for cross-cultural dialogue and developing a shared identity between residents of East Sarajevo and Sarajevo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Opportunities for bridgebuilding between residents of East Sarajevo and Sarajevo</td>
<td>• Perceived level of residents’ trust in municipal institutions (social contract)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Impacts on everyday mobility between residents of East Sarajevo and Sarajevo</td>
<td>• Perceived levels of safety and openness to members of other identity groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data obtained from these interviews (discussed in the data and analysis chapter) shows how local residents interact in the day-to-day with the “other” city, how relevant the urban partition and resulting segregation is to their daily lives, and if they self-perceived any limitation or barriers concerning their own presence in the other city.

### 3.5.2 Participant Observation (Neighborhood Scale and Events)

By working with the PCRC I was able to participate in local lectures and events related to post-conflict recovery and reconciliation that were hosted or sponsored by PCRC. One such multistakeholder event focused on a post-conflict victims’ support and advocacy organization and featured a large gathering of academics, social activists, political party representatives, internationals, and civil society representatives to learn about the social issues the organization was seeking to address and to conduct cross-sector dialogue on the topic afterwards. Participating in the event was relevant to this research in that it exposed the multiple interpretations and perspectives of many different local stakeholders on a significant social issue, thus conveying the enduring considerable local complexity of what is considered
fair and just in a society still recovering from conflict which occurred more than two decades previously.

In addition to conducting local area interviews, I spent several days on foot or on bike in the Lukavica (East Sarajevo) and Dobrinja (Sarajevo) municipal border area allowing me to conduct spatial analysis and observe the processes of everyday life related to mobility, identity group collective memory and symbolism, economic activity, and partitioning.

3.5.3 Documentation and Secondary Research

From a theoretical perspective, this thesis draws from academic literature and technical reports related to urban post-conflict concepts related to urban fragility, the changed nature of armed conflict and the changing nature of urban post-conflict response mechanisms. All secondary research was based on information from publicly available sources.

3.5.4 Limitations

Thesis research was conducted from 17 August to 20 December 2018 with 33 days of field research in Sarajevo between September and November 2018. Time limitations precluded additional interviews and field research, which would have provided additional relevant data.

In addition, the scope of this research is focused to post-conflict cities involving international recovery interventions. However, most armed conflicts in the world, to include urban conflicts involving non-state actors such as criminal gangs or drug cartels, do not receive interventions involving the international community (Patterson and Eck 2018, p. 537).

Given the more limited scope of this thesis, additional follow on research concerning fragile cities afflicted by non-state armed conflict and violence, but not necessarily involving large-scale international community intervention, is also warranted.

4 THE SARAJEVO SITUATION

This chapter provides a contextual basis for the Sarajevo case study analysis by presenting a brief overview of events and conditions relevant to Sarajevo’s post-conflict situation.

4.1 A Diverse City

Sarajevo, population 342,577 (UN DESA 2018, n.p) is a mid-sized city that has arguably witnessed more transitions over the last 150 years than any other similarly sized city in the world (Larsen 2015, p. tr1). As a European city placed at the geographical confluence of east and west,
of different religious faiths and hegemonic empires, and of impactful events that have shaped modern history, Sarajevo has many past identities: an Ottoman city, an Austro-Hungarian city, a socialist city, an Olympic city, a war-torn city.

However, counter to the conventional narrative, Sarajevo was not always a pluralistic city - in the 1600’s it was primarily a mono-ethnic Muslim city (author interview with local senior civil society manager, 6 November 2018). That being said, throughout most of its history it has always had one uniform consistency; its high level of diversity and multicultural tolerance (Hasic 2004, p. 176).

Today, however, official census data presents a different narrative. Sarajevo is no longer populated by a blend of diverse residents. Instead, it is more of a monocultural city with one predominate identity group, Bosniaks, comprising 84 percent of the population (BiH Official Census 2013, n.p.). Likewise, in East New Sarajevo, across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) which partitioned Sarajevo in the Dobrinja neighborhood, another ethnonational identity group predommates with Bosnian Serbs comprising 97 percent of the population (BiH Official Census 2013, n.p.).


The city endured the most protracted urban siege in modern history during the Bosnian war (Aquilué and Roca 2015, p.1) and was the victim of attempted “Urbicide - the deliberate destruction of a city and its assets” (Bollens 2006, p. 89) at the hands of the Bosnia Serb army during the 1992 to 1996 intrastate war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. An estimated 11,000 residents were killed, 80 percent of utilities were put out of action and 60 percent of the buildings were ruined or damaged (Lamphere-Englund 2015, p. 3). Post-conflict social, economic and physical recovery continues to this day.

\[
\text{Everything had to be adapted to the actual situation – in Sarajevo in that time, no one was able to know what will happen tomorrow!}
\]

Dr. Tarik Kupusović, Mayor of Sarajevo 1994 to 1996
author interview, 8 November 2018

The siege of Sarajevo began on 6 April 1992 when Bosnian Serb snipers shot into protesters gathered for a peace rally and lasted until 29 February 1996 when the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina declared that the siege had officially ended – it was particularly brutal with many violations of international humanitarian law (Amnesty International 2000, p.1). Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) forces, and initially, the Yugoslavian National Army encircled Sarajevo from the
high ground overlooking the city and controlled land access in and out of Sarajevo. From the vantage of the high ground surrounding Sarajevo, the VRS was able to bombard the city with tanks, artillery, rockets, and snipers with little to no impediments (see Figure 4-1).

Early in the conflict, the besieged Bosnian forces established a cramped tunnel below the front lines to bring in small amounts of necessities and food for the city. The UN also controlled the airport and negotiated with Bosnian Serb forces for air and land transport of limited humanitarian supplies. During the heaviest time of attacks, more than 3700 shells bombarded the city in a given day (United Nations 2001, p.1). The interdependent systems of the city were severely impacted by the targeted destruction of the residential electric, gas, phone line and water systems by VRS and paramilitary forces. For example, the centralized water pumping system was dependent on electricity (United Nations 1994, n.p.) and water supplies were routinely disrupted with near constant power outages.

The events which precipitated, and occurred during, Sarajevo’s four-year siege are involved, and are, in and of themselves, mainly outside the scope of this thesis. That being said, many components of the violence used against the city of Sarajevo were prototypes of the armed conflict afflicting many cities today and are important to highlight. Characteristics of the conflict in Sarajevo included:

• the presence of transnational criminal networks acting in collusion with state officials from all sides (Antonopoulos 2010, pgs. 251-253);
• the extensive use of paramilitary forces and armed non-state actors (Voice of America 2017, n.p);
• the internationalization of the conflict with foreign states providing support and materials to some of the warring parties (Engelberg & Schmitt 1995, p.1); and,
• the proximity to broader regional armed conflict and violence.
Figure 4-1 The battle lines of Sarajevo

Some neighborhoods of the city, such as Grbavica and Dobrinja where partially taken by Bosnian Serb army and paramilitary forces and the “front line was inside and in between the buildings” (Pilav 2012, p.26). The urban conflict was also densely covered by the international media in real time or near real time which the various stakeholders sought to use for their advantage. In the end, just as the war was internationalized so, too, was the peace when an international effort led to the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) on 14 December 1995, which stopped the fighting but institutionalized the ethnonational partitioning of both the state and city of Sarajevo itself (author interview, former BiH senior government official, 28 September 2018).

4.3 A Post-Conflict City

The partition of Sarajevo occurred as a result of the terms and conditions of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), the 14 December 1995 peace agreement which ended the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the siege of Sarajevo (see Figure 5-28). The 1992 to 1996 Bosnia-Herzegovina intrastate conflict was waged from ethnonational identity conflated with religious identity among the three dominate identity groups of the state (Bosnian Serbs, Bosnia Croats and Bosniaks). Sarajevo was the dominant urban center and served as the multi-ethnic capital city of the state of BiH. (See Figure 5-3 for a pre- and post-conflict comparative ethnic makeup of the city from before and after the conflict.)

At the end of the conflict, the IEBL, established as part of the DPA, separated the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina into two entities, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS) (with a third OSCE administered city, Brčko). The IEBL also separated
Sarajevo in the southeastern Dobrinja portion of the city which resulted in the establishment of East Sarajevo in the RS entity (see Figures 5-2 and 5-28). Specific areas of Sarajevo were placed in new jurisdictions and “resettled” along ethnonational lines (Pilav 2012, p. 33) resulting in entrenched urban segregation that survives to this day as an enduring national template.

In accordance with the DPA, an international post-conflict intervention co-orchestrated by the UN, the World Bank, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the OSCE headquartered in Sarajevo was established to support the implementation of the agreement and country’s “reconstruction and development” with a $5.1 billion western aid package (Hasic 2004, p. 177). However, as urban scholars Aquilué and Roca point out, “the DPA marked the end of the war but resolved neither the ethnic conflict nor its recomposed demographic impact” (2016, p. 155).

Other data shows that proportionally little funding was initially spent on demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) support activities such as psycho-social support or alternative livelihoods training (see Figure 5-23). Finally, in some cases, questions remain on the sufficiency of the technical knowledge provided in the initial stages of the recovery efforts. “International ‘experts’ from the World Bank had experience with post-socialist transitions countries like the Czech Republic and Poland but no experience in post-conflict, post-socialist countries” (author interview with former senior FBiH federal official who oversaw aid and recovery coordination with UN agencies from 1994 to 1998, 7 November 2018.

A significant factor which complicated Sarajevo’s post-conflict situation was its simultaneous political, economic and conflict transition. The post-conflict recovery of Sarajevo was underscored by three simultaneous contextual factors: the change from communism to democracy, from war to peace, and from a planned economy to a free market economy. As one senior diplomat assigned to Sarajevo explained to me, “While other central eastern and central European countries were busy making the transition to open market economies, here they had to focus on recovering from the war first” (author discussion, 28 September 2018). Another serving diplomat explained it this way, “The biggest issue for the recovery was the triple transition” (author interview, 10 November 2018).

Another senior Bosnian official directly involved with recovery and reconstruction from 1995 to 1998 conveyed that the local society had no experience with democracy at the time and that for many people “democracy was equated with nationalism; not for the good of all, but for the good of my own people” (author interview, 7 November 2018). To further complicate recovery amid Sarajevo’s triple transition, to fulfill the DPA’s complex power sharing agreement among the three national entities, a highly complex governance structure was implemented.
To provide additional international oversight on the FBiH and RS’s implementation of the civilian aspects of the DPA, the DPA established an “Office of the High Representative” (OHR) in Sarajevo. The OHR reports “periodically on progress to the United Nations, European Union, United States, Russian Federation and other interested governments, parties and organisations” (OHR 2018, n.p.). The OHR remains in place today. More than two decades after the guns went silent and the rockets stopped, Sarajevo continues to be assessed as the one highly fragile post-conflict city of Europe (Igarapé Institute 2015, n.p.).

5  KEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

As discussed in Chapter 3, Research Objectives, Design and Methodology, the thesis conducted a case study analysis of Sarajevo’s international post-conflict intervention approaches and outcomes through the lens of a theoretical framework consisting of social contract, liberal peace, and collective memory theory in order to identify the long-term impacts of these approaches and outcomes at the municipal and neighborhood scale. This chapter presents key finding and analysis at both the macro and meso levels.

• At the macro level of analysis, the research identifies key characteristics of Sarajevo’s post-conflict recovery approach and related outcomes which might be useful to know for other cities currently in, or transitioning from, intrastate conflict and violence. Identified outcomes were:

  o The post-conflict partitioning of Sarajevo into East Sarajevo and Sarajevo.
  o Post-conflict population resettlement.
  o Rapid political and market liberalization.
  o A focus on physical reconstruction.

• At the meso level of analysis, the research identifies local long-term socio-spatial impacts related to Sarajevo’s post-conflict recovery approach and outcomes, and their potential linkages to urban fragility in the everyday, namely through:

  o Analysis of physical (socio-spatial), social (intergroup linkages), governance and economic factors at the municipal scale (East Sarajevo and Sarajevo).
  o Analysis of physical (socio-spatial) social (intergroup linkages) factors at the neighborhood scale (border areas of the neighborhoods of Lukavica (City of East Sarajevo) and Dobrinja (City of Sarajevo).
  o Identifying evidence of positive local developments which may foster reduced urban fragility and promote stability.
5.1 Summary

Sarajevo provides a useful example for why better integrating urban planners and local residents with urban humanitarian and stabilization first responders can serve an essential role for developing initial socio-spatial strategies, policies and approaches from an integrated local needs-based perspective. Perhaps to illustrate this point, one senior BiH official explained that in Sarajevo, “the United Nations was never about needs, it was always about political bargains with the respective parties” (author interview, 7 November 2018). Even within potentially limiting entity-level political constraints related to partitioning and population resettlement, the increased use and integration of urban planner earlier in the post-conflict process could have bolstered efforts to increase local urban planning capacity – a technical capacity shortfall specifically highlighted in a significant 2015 assessment of the rebuilding of Sarajevo (Lamphere-Englund 2015, p. 31).

It is noticeable that in spite of the changes that have arisen throughout the Bosnian territory, which have seriously affected regional planning, the situation at the level of urban planning seems to remain frozen. Since the war, no new urban masterplan has been made and consequently the existing planning documentation at the urban scale conforms to that made in 1986 – revised in 1990 and 1998.

Aquilué and Roca 2016, p. 157

5.1.1 Macro Level of Analysis: Key Methods and Approaches used in Sarajevo’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Key methods and approaches used in Sarajevo’s post-conflict recovery include:

• post-conflict partitioning and population resettlement (Pilav 2012, p. 33);
• the “Liberal Peace” approach (Paris 2004, p. 99; author interviews with former senior BiH official directly involved in the recovery planning of Sarajevo, 28 September 2018); and,
• an initial focus to physical infrastructure reconstruction (Bollens 2006 p. 100; author interviews with senior BiH officials directly involved in the recovery planning of Sarajevo, 5, 7 and 10 November 2018).

The interrelated outcomes of all three of the factors directly shape Sarajevo’s current governance, physical, social and economic makeup. East Sarajevo is distinctly politically, physically and socially separated from Sarajevo (though less so economically).
Most of the individuals I interviewed that were under 30 years old thought the partition of the city made little difference (author interviews with local residents of East Sarajevo and Sarajevo, 11 to 14 November 2018) in their day to day living. However, very few individuals expressed optimism for future job opportunities or that the government was interested in any meaningful actions beyond preserving its future (ibid.). Of course, lack of faith in a government’s ability to effectively manage and represent the needs of the local population is hardly a rare occurrence, and residents of many cities would surely share this sentiment. In a post-conflict situation, the continued lack of faith in governmental institutions appears to be a significant factor as shown by Freedom House’s dismal ratings related to the overall political environment for Sarajevo. In every subsequent year since 2009 (when assessments were initiated) the national “Democracy Score” for Bosnia-Herzegovina has continued to decline, reaching an all-time low in 2017, the most current period (Freedom House 2018, n.p.).

Given its emphasis on effective governance, Muggah’s framework, then, provides a good starting point for analyzing urban fragility in contemporary Sarajevo. As described in the second chapter, his framework combines social contract theory with eleven identified multidimensional risk factors that, when accumulated, can foster tension in an urban environment resulting in increased urban fragility. As described previously, these urban risk factors might include high population growth (especially a “youth bulge”), being located in a fragile or conflict country, unplanned and rapid urbanization, concentrated poverty, income inequality, high unemployment, access to services, violent crimes, environmental fragility, terrorism, and the percentage of press references to conflict (2015, n.p.).

In Muggah’s framework (see Figure 5-1), these stresses, combined with the local capacity of municipalities to deliver on the social contract, create a combination which creates urban fragility. However, given the typically high degree of physical and social destruction resulting from urban conflict, and in order to more accurately assess impacting risk factors of urban fragility, his framework may need modifications for initial urban post-conflict recovery situations, to include criteria such as the continued exposure to armed non-state actors, population resettlement and unresolved drivers of conflict.

For example, as a precursor to the changed nature of armed conflict today, the siege of Sarajevo featured the use of armed non-state actors, However, Sarajevo’s post-conflict situation differs from many current post-conflict cities such as Mosul or Raqqa in that groups of armed non-state actors largely ceased to be a destabilizing factor during the post-conflict period. Armed non-state actors in the Sarajevo context operated under the control of the state’s political elites (Hussain 2018, n.p.) who, in turn, responded to the dictates of the DPA (author interview with former senior BiH official, 28 September 2018).
However, when applying this framework (see Figure 5-1) to the post-conflict setting of Sarajevo today, Muggah and his organization conclude that Sarajevo is a fragile city based on the pressure of several of the above risk factors including high unemployment, conflict preoccupation (measured as a percent of local press coverage), and institutional weakness that precludes the municipal governance structure honoring their side of the social contract (Muggah 2013 and 2015, n.p.).

5.1.2 Meso Level of Analysis: Socio-Spatial Outcomes and Impacts of Sarajevo’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction

At the meso level of analysis, a visible manifestation of identity group separation is seen in the socio-spatial organization and division between the adjacent cities of East Sarajevo, with its dominant Bosnian Serb Orthodox Christian majority and Sarajevo, with its dominant Bosniak Muslim majority (Bosnia and Herzegovina Government 2013, n.p.).

Additionally, separate identity group collective memory (see section 2.4.4) is reinforced through institutions, de facto segregation, and exclusive identity group imagery and memorialization (see Figures 5-10 to 5-19). Some schools adjacent to Sarajevo still follow a “two schools under one roof” policy with classes, curriculum, and physical space segregated along ethnic lines in the same building (OSCE 2018, pgs. 5-6). Ethnonational imagery and exclusionary cultural artifacts and symbology linked to one identity group or the other are prominent in both East Sarajevo and Sarajevo.
In Sarajevo and East Sarajevo, religion remains firmly linked to ethnonational identity has subsequently become politicized. Local religious leaders and laypersons alike that local interfaith bridgebuilding efforts are nominal and ineffective. “The interfaith community among religious leader is active in Sarajevo area but politically co-opted” (author interview with senior academic and religious official, 1 November 2018). Interfaith dialogues and community bridging efforts between the different faiths do occur but appear to be more at the local grassroots level and implemented by INGOs. (Bolton 2017, pgs. 23-27). However, others call these efforts “superficial” and state that “there is a huge need” for authentic interfaith dialogue (author interview with local civil society organization manager, 28 September 2018).

5.2 Macro Analysis: Approaches and Outcomes of Sarajevo’s Post-Conflict Recovery

In many ways, the international community had significant planning time to prepare and organize for Sarajevo’s post-conflict recovery. “The ‘transition’ to peace lasted for almost two years” from 1994 to 1996 (author interview on 5 November 2018 with Dr. Tarik Kupusović, Mayor of Sarajevo from 1994 to 1996) when the UN Secretary General appointed an Office of the Special Coordinator for Sarajevo in March 1994 “in order to mobilize and coordinate international support for the restoration of essential public services in Sarajevo” (NATO 1999, p. 1).

The post-conflict emphasis was primarily focused on physical infrastructure and the recovery of public services. Social recovery programs such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) activities designed to disarm and reintegrate former combatants as civilians into society were not emphasized during the initial post-conflict recovery period 1996 to 1998 as the comparatively (very) low funding amounts indicate (see Figure 5-27).
5.2.1 The Post-Conflict Partition of Sarajevo

Figure 5-2 Post-Conflict Partition of Sarajevo

5.2.1.1 The Post-Conflict Partitioning of Sarajevo and Displacement of Populations

East Sarajevo now consists of four urban municipalities which extend for miles across mountains and valleys and is populated by almost 80,000 people, overwhelmingly Bosnian Serbs. Consequently, from a heterogeneous city with a high degree of residential mixing between Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and others, Sarajevo became two largely homogenous urban bodies embedded in two different political entities.

Bădescu 2014, p. 39

As first presented in Chapter 4, partition as a peacekeeping method was adopted soon after the division of Sarajevo along ethnonational lines. In the initial months following the signing of the peace treaty, 62,000 Bosnian Serb from within Sarajevo (largely from the contested, and formally ethnically mixed, neighborhood of Grbavica) were displaced from Sarajevo to new areas controlled by the Bosnian Serb army on the east side of Dobrinja (Berdal and Suhrke 2012, p. 9). During interviews of residents from East Sarajevo, several individuals were very vocal about the emotional significance this relocation has to the self-identity of individuals from East Sarajevo (author interviews with residents from East Sarajevo, 12 to 14 November 2018). Three separate individuals expressed that that “our fathers built this city from nothing” and the Bosnian Serbs need to have this space “as our own.”
In his 1997 article on the topic, Radha Kumar wrote that "partition has more often been a backdrop to war than its culmination in peace; although it may originate in a situation of conflict, its effect has been to stimulate further and even new conflict" (p. 24). In Sarajevo, the DPA promoted the institutionalization of ethnonational entrenchment trough political and spatial partitioning. For example, Grbavica, which had been mainly taken over by Bosnian Serb forces and paramilitary groups during the conflict, was allocated to the city of Sarajevo and FBiH jurisdiction. The nearby neighborhood of Lukavica, adjacent to Dobrinja, was removed from the city of Sarajevo and allocated to the RS as the foundation for the development of the city of East Sarajevo (Bassi 2015, p. 101).

On the other hand, in situations of urban intrastate post-conflict recovery such as in Sarajevo, is there a sensible alternative to peacemaking strategies which partition space and separate conflict parties? While the partitioning of polarized ethnic communities in cities as has ample precedent as a last resort “stabilization” approach (Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Nicosia) it is hardly a long-term peacebuilding approach (Calame and Charlesworth 2009, p. 233). From a long-term perspective, partitioning and identity group segregation appears to facilitate instability and fragility. As one senior GIZ technical manager pointed out “social segregation leads to young people saying enough is enough, and there is a complete collapse of the social contract. Life becomes socially unbearable” (author interview, 20 September 2018).

In contrast, consider the example of post-conflict recovery efforts in Rwanda, where intrastate armed conflict and genocide from 1988 to 1994 resulted in an estimated 800,000 deaths (UN 2018, n.p.). In this situation, post-conflict reconciliation took a very different approach.

According to the post-conflict academic, Dhammika Herath, in Rwanda “social reconciliation supposedly constitutes an important component” of the post-conflict recovery approach (2018, n.p.). Herath’s recent research shows that the Rwandan government adopted a “one nation” recovery approach “which tries to build cooperation between formerly antagonistic groups through grassroots cooperative activities” (ibid.). The Rwandan government also prohibits the use of ethnic descriptions, for example, Hutu and Tutsi, and instead requires its citizens to identify themselves as “Rwandans” to establish a common Rwandan identity (ibid.). The Rwanda example is particularly interesting because it provides one example where a society traumatized by extensive intrastate violence and genocide has deliberately chosen to take a common path towards cooperative engagement and interaction with the “other.”

In the post-conflict urban environment, cities retain their economic functions and networks. Urban planners can work together with stabilization and first responders to plan for shared space and grass-roots cooperative economic initiatives among different groups that foster small-step linkages that help set the enabling conditions for cooperation, interaction and opportunities for
economic livelihoods. Partitioning groups into separate and removed geographies makes this process far more difficult.

5.2.1.2 Urban Partitioning Contributes to the Entrenched Separation of Sarajevo’s Ethnonational Identity Groups and Fosters Social and Governance Fragility. (Social Contract)

In Sarajevo, identity groups were partitioned and clustered, a process that remains mostly unchanged today. Ethnonational political positions were frozen at war’s end and only further entrenched with post-conflict infrastructure and social reconstruction political policies and activities which focused on ethnonational lines. The partitioning of the city with the boundary line resulted in “clustering” – a process where “ethnic groups tend to feel protected by enclosing themselves” (Calame and Charlesworth 2009, p. 208).

Furthermore, large-scale forced civilian displacement took place in the immediate post-conflict period where approximately 60-70,000 Serb civilians in early 1996 were forcibly relocated from Bosnian Serb held neighborhoods in Sarajevo to Republika Srpska territory (Berdal and Suhrke 2012, p. 9).

From this perspective, residents who were forced to relocate to the new city of East Sarajevo lost their ability to take on a transformative role in changing their city, Sarajevo – traditionally a pluralistic city – after nearly four years of conflict. Even today, residents of East Sarajevo and Sarajevo have limited mobility access to their adjacent city – limited road connectivity, no taxi reciprocity (East Sarajevo taxis cannot legally operate in Sarajevo and vice versa), no direct streetcar transit and limited bus services (author interview, East Sarajevo Resident, 12 Nov 2018).

As Leonard et al. point out in their recent study of peacebuilding in Sarajevo, “Homogenous living situations decrease opportunities for intergroup contact for both young and old and ultimately perpetuate the conflict by contributing to the physical, social, and emotional separation of the communities” (2016, p. 18).

5.2.2 Population Resettlement

*Many citizens from reintegrated parts of Sarajevo escaped to Republic of Srpska under strong propaganda and pressure of their leaders.*

Dr. Tarik Kupusović, Mayor of Sarajevo from 1994 to 1996
8 November 2018
During the siege period, Bosnia Serb army units and paramilitary forces fired upon residents in the city from the buildings they controlled in the Gravica neighborhood. Even after the signing of the peace accord and prior to partitioning, tensions in the contested space were high with at least one additional attack occurring from Gravica into Bosniak controlled Sarajevo when a rocket-propelled grenade was fired upon the newly re-opened tram line, killing one passenger and injuring six others in January 1996 (Sullivan 1996, n.p.). With the signing of the DPA, Bosnian Serbs agreed to relinquish the areas they controlled in Sarajevo neighborhoods such as Gravica and Dobrinja. With the departure of Bosnian Serb army units from these areas, Bosnian Serb civilian residents decamped as well.

The subsequent displacement was led by both “push and pull” factors. The Sarajevo City Council wanted to “push” out residents, mostly Bosnian Serbs or Croats, who had fled the city during the siege,” helping to keep a [now] largely Muslim city from returning to the melting pot it once was” (Hedges 1996, n.p.). This approach also provided room for the return of Bosniak internally displaced persons (IDP) and refugees who had fled the country during the conflict (ibid.). After at least 240,000 pre-war inhabitants left Sarajevo, migrating to Western countries, to Serbia or to the Republika Srpska, 90,000 IDPs took their place (Stefansson, 2007, p. 59). Most of the IDPs were conflict-displaced Bosniaks, mainly from Eastern and Northern Bosnia. Many of them saw Sarajevo as their new home, since returning to pre-war homes meant returning to areas now located in the Republika Srpska (Bădescu 2015, p. 39).

Official encouragement from Bosnian Serb leaders also encouraged Bosnian Serb resident departure from Gravica. The Republika Srpska government sought to “pull” these same residents to populate the newly established area of East Sarajevo, the intended new urban center in the Republika Srpska located next to the Dobrinja neighborhood in Sarajevo (Aquilué and Roca 2016, p. 155). Some reports indicate that many of the Bosnian Serb residents bitterly resented their displacement from Gravica. Several of them reportedly burned their apartments to render them unusable for new residents while international forces chose not to intervene saying Bosnian Serbs “have the right to burn their own houses" and that the international force "is not a police force and will not undertake police duties” (Pomfret 1996, n.p.).

*The ethnic distance that has been encouraged by the political elites for political purposes during post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina is associated with high levels of psychological and social distance, meaning it does not aid in the improvement of intergroup relations since it discourages contact between the groups.*

Leonard et al 2016, p. 8
One of the key provisions of the DPA was the right of return for all persons displaced by war to their original homes and neighborhoods, but according to the International Crisis Group, “chauvinist agendas and entrenched power structures of the nationalist parties kept “minority” returns to a minimum” (2002, n.p.)

5.2.3 Rapid Political and Market Liberalization

The need for sufficient governmental capacity as a precursor for a “liberal peace” approach in post-conflict settings is emphasized by academics who note that “this is not to say that liberalism is bad, only that governance institutions must have the capacity to manage the destabilization that comes with the transition to open markets and liberal democracy” (Paris 2004, p.188). Another notes that “liberal peacebuilding initiatives often fail to connect to the place-based, everyday issues such as infrastructure, housing, and schooling and to improve the conditions of everyday life” (Björkdahl 2014, p. 2).

In many ways, the “liberal peace” approach taken on by the peacebuilding intervention effort (Paris 2004 p.99) coupled with the lack of attention to local institutional capacity development seemed to hamper the establishment, organization and strengthening – the capacity – of accountable planning and the administration of state and municipal governance structures.

Furthermore, other scholars note that the “liberalization policies in the economy were implemented without considering the local circumstances, causing counterproductive outcomes” as demonstrated with the example of the quick privatization process of public assets which provided a mechanism for local elites to “consolidate their position” (Martín-Diaz 2014, p. 311). As Lamphere-Englund highlights, in a fragile, impressionable post-conflict setting, these precedents can “shape long-term urban and political development, either to the benefit or determent, of subsequent democratic development” (2015, p. 8).

In Sarajevo, senior government officials that played a direct role in post-conflict recovery efforts were very clear that local and national governance institutions were nowhere near ready to take on the planning, coordination, managing, oversight and accountability functions now expected of them. One senior official BiH explained, “institutions were not in place to underpin and implement these international assistance efforts. Nothing: not judicial, political, economic, justice. Nothing had transitioned from the previously collapsed system” (author interview, 7 November 2018).

Given the above contextual factors, weak local institutions were likely susceptible to corruption with little accountability or enforcement mechanisms. While outside the specific scope of this research, it is relevant to note given the comparatively large amount of donor funding made
available (see Figure 5-26) and large-scale destabilizing impact that corruption can have in peacebuilding efforts.

Reconstruction in post-conflict cities has often been addressed by security, engineers, architects, financiers, infrastructure planners, and others “as technical problems with little regard for the broader impact on society” (Humanitarian Space 2013, n.p.). Cities are populated with multiple resident neighborhoods and urban residents traumatized by armed conflict must also recover. A central focus on physical reconstruction combined with “liberal peace” recovery methodologies, which included a quick market and political liberalism approach for urban post-conflict recovery, have been shown to be insufficient or even counter-productive (Paris 2004, p. 101; 187-188) in fragile settings with weak institutions.

In Sarajevo, there are questions regarding other costs associated with the narrower focusing on physical reconstruction. More inclusion of residents into reconstruction planning and fostering and coordinating the inclusion of local initiatives might have facilitated the necessary “social reconciliation” that some urban researchers say was so missing from this approach (Bollens 2006, p. 100). While localization and capacity development were often promoted in 1996 by the international community on paper, in practical terms, “outside implementers were used, and the donors often went directly to them” (author interview with former senior FBiH federal official who oversaw aid and recovery coordination with UN agencies from 1994 to 1998, 7 November 2018).

Of particular note is that in 2018, the UNDP’s focus in Sarajevo is on local governance and capacity development: “Our efforts are now focused on urban governance in capacity development, public service, and citizen participation. Seventy percent of our budget goes to developing local governance systems” (author interview with Sarajevo-based senior UNDP official, 19 November 2018).

At the time of initial post-conflict recovery, donor funding was very significant. For example, the Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Program (PRRP), implemented by the World Bank, the European Commission, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and USAID at the end of the conflict, provided $5.1 billion (in 1995 dollars) for physical infrastructure repair and key elements of the economy. This shows the amount of large-scale funding and priorities that international donors were prepared to make in support of a post-conflict rapid market and political liberalism-led transformation.

The World Bank’s own review and assessment of the PRRP shows a higher level of satisfaction with physical infrastructure recovery (“reconstruction of physical assets has been the most highly successful aspect of the program”), with a more tepid assessment for institutional capacity
development with (“modest achievements have been made over the last three years in building and strengthening institutions”) (Word Bank 1999, p. 1).

Moreover, as the rush to physical reconstruction and a market economy took off, and as Lamphere-Englund points out in his 2015 analysis of Sarajevo recovery, “many failures in Sarajevo could have been avoided by having the necessary urban planning, administrative, and governance structures organized during the earliest years (p. 2).”

Given the significant challenges of Sarajevo’s simultaneous “triple transition” coupled with low governmental and private-sector institutional capacities, and low tracking and accountability of donor funding (author interview, Senior BiH Official, 7 November 2018; Lamphere-Englund 2015, p. 14), large scale funding for physical reconstruction would appear to have most likely benefited the existing local power structures. In 1996 Bosnia-Herzegovina (and arguably, 2018 Bosnia-Herzegovina), these were the wartime ethnonational political parties who remained most interested in fulfilling wartime aims of division obtained through their newly-legitimized political power as a result of their success in the new state’s first national elections held in September 1996. Accordingly, the “World Bank turned to the dominant political elites to implement its reconstruction programs” (Doubt et al 2007, p. 8).

This continuation of wartime political leadership in the post-conflict setting highlights a fundamental dilemma regarding existing institutional capacity in post-conflict situations: how do post-conflict recovery specialists work with institutions or individuals that might have been enablers or causal factors for conflict in the first place? This is particularly relevant in situations where the local population’s trust in local government officials/institutions is broken (or never existed to begin with). In these situations, bottom up local governance and community-led programming along with top down institutional capacity development with accountability mechanisms can help build local trust and foster the (re)establishment of the social contract.

5.2.4 A Focus to Physical Reconstruction

After the war there was an urgent need for infrastructure repair to provide shelter: this was much more necessary that many people realize. The question on whether social recovery was needed as much as physical infrastructure recovery was not even discussed given the severity of the destruction and enormity of the reconstruction need.

Former senior FBiH federal official who oversaw aid and recovery coordination with UN agencies from 1994 to 1998 (author interview 7 November 2018)
The planning for Sarajevo’s post-conflict recovery began in March 1994 – nearly two years before the end of armed conflict when the UN Secretary General appointed an Office of the Special Coordinator for Sarajevo in March 1994 “in order to mobilize and coordinate international support for the restoration of essential public services in Sarajevo” (NATO 1999, p. 1). With political, economic and conflict societal transformation coinciding, national and international groups struggled how to move forward but ultimately viewed Sarajevo’s reconstruction primarily in physical terms, leaving the development of local institutional capacity with little attention in the first years of recovery (Lamphere-Englund 2015, pgs. 7-8).

Senior Bosnian federal and Sarajevo municipal officials that directly participated in post-conflict recovery activities at the time mostly agreed with this assessment, stressing that in most cases international donors would “bypass local ministries to implement and oversee the project’s themselves” (author interview, 5 November 2018), thus undermining institutional capacity development and limiting local inclusion in the recovery of the city itself. Additionally, other senior Bosnian government officials noted that “institutions were not in place to underpin and implement these international assistance efforts. Nothing - not judicial, political, economic, justice, - nothing had transitioned from the previously collapsed system. There were no rules - market capitalism came into this vacuum” (author interview, 7 November 2018).

Insufficient checks and balances and oversight procedures fostered corruption and “in Sarajevo, donors were aware of corruption and looked the other way” (author interview with senior researcher based in Sarajevo, 20 December 2018). The former BiH official agreed that corruption and low oversight was problematic and had a negative cascade on local capacity development. “Humanitarian Mine Action activities were exploited with lavish funding, low oversight and M&E and corruption. Because of this it took BiH several years before it could develop its capabilities” (author interview, Former Senior BiH Government Official, 7 November 2018). The link between corruption and fragility was also noted during an interview with a senior GIZ technical manager when he told me that “a root cause of fragility is extortion and corruption” (author interview, senior GIZ technical manager II, 20 September 2018).

Physical infrastructure reconstruction is but one factor in urban post-conflict recovery. In Sarajevo, it was not only institutional development that was cited as receiving insufficient attention by the international community, inadequate social recovery programming was also referenced in interviews as a shortcoming of the recovery effort. In one local interview with a long-serving OSCE official in Sarajevo, the individual informed me that “people never got proper help in Sarajevo - and they still have PTSD” (author interview with OSCE official, 27 September 2018).

It is for reasons such as this that many post-conflict reconstruction specialists argue that post-conflict recovery is an interdependent process involving some form of physical infrastructure
restoration, institutional development, and social recovery (Martin-Díaz 2014, p. 306; Barakat 2010, p. 11; Lamphere-Englund 2015, pgs. 31-33).

In Sarajevo, there appear to be missed opportunities for better social recovery. For example, interviews with religious and community civil society leaders indicated that inter-faith cooperation and dialogue occurred at best at a nominal level but has done little, with some notable exceptions, to serve as a past or current mainstream bridgebuilding mechanism between identity groups (separate author interviews on 28 September 2018, 1 November 2018 and 6 November 2018).

Figure 5-3 Population. Sarajevo (Pre- and Post-Conflict; East Sarajevo and Sarajevo 2013

Comparative Ethnic Composition of Sarajevo (Pre-War and Post-War)

Comparative Ethnic Composition of Sarajevo and East Sarajevo (2013 BiH Census)

Source: Lamphere-Englund 2015, pgs. 4 and 19

5.3 Meso Analysis: Municipal Scale (City of East Sarajevo and City of Sarajevo)

At the meso level of analysis, the thesis research data substantiates many of Muggah’s findings (2015, n.p) assessing Sarajevo as a fragile city.

Individuals, particularly younger residents under 30, appear to have little faith that the city can provide sufficient livelihood opportunities or that the government can deliver on critical aspects of the social contract. In 2017, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s youth unemployment rate was 55% (World Bank 2018, n.p.), amongst the highest in the world. Less than 1 out of 4 working-age adults has a job in the formal economy (Fengler et al 2015, n.p.). In a 2017 UNDP survey of residents under 30 years old, 67.3% stated that “authorities lack the capacities and preconditions to successfully confront all the problems” (2017, p.8). One expert who has previously published formal reports on Sarajevo’s post-conflict recovery told me that every tech start-up business he knew had decamped to another city outside the country because investment and growth conditions were so adverse (author interview with local academic, 20 December 2018).

Additionally, local municipal institutions in both East Sarajevo and Sarajevo seem mostly unable or unwilling to facilitate or foster greater interaction or dialogue between their respective residents. One local official stated that intergroup engagement happens at the individual initiative level (such as in sports or enrolling your children in activities) but not at the institutional level. From this perspective individuals are not avoiding opportunities for interaction in everyday activities with members of different identity group who live in different urban areas “they are just not aware of how to participate in them” (author interview with local senior civil society member, 6 November 2018). Furthermore, the current mayor of East New Sarajevo was quite candid when he explicitly stated that neither he nor his staff coordinated with their municipal counterparts in the city of Sarajevo (author interview, 13 November 2018).

5.3.1 Physical and Environmental (Socio-Spatial)

5.3.1.1 A High Emphasis on Exclusive Collective Memory

The reminders of Sarajevo’s partition are everyday through both East Sarajevo and Sarajevo. Both cities feature many memorials, murals, or symbolisms distinctly linked to separate narratives associated with separate ethnonational identities (see Figures 5-10 to 5-19). Urban researcher Annika Björkdahl illustrates this point explicitly when she concludes from a recent visit to East Sarajevo remarking on “the prominence of Serb symbols and narrative in the everyday and as spatial markers reminding the visitor of the who the space belongs to” (2018, p. 39). Likewise, in Sarajevo, reminders of victimhood are frequently visible through the numerous examples of “Sarajevo Roses” (see Figure 5-25), impacts on the streets and sidewalks that were caused by fatal mortar attacks and have been filled in with red resin to remember those killed by
Bosnian Serbs during the siege of Sarajevo (author interview with former Bosnian army soldier, 25 September 2018).

Often, the exhibited symbolism of one identity groups is diametrically opposite of the viewpoint of the other. An example of this is highlighted by the “Choosing Peace Together” program, an intergroup peacebuilding initiative sponsored by Catholic Relief Services, an INGO active in Sarajevo. The program references how Bosnian Serb educational curriculum glorifies Gavrilo Princip, the assassin of Archduke Ferdinand and an event which led to the start of WW I, as someone to be revered, a feeling not shared by the Bosniak community (Bolton 2017, p. 22). This sentiment on the part of Bosnian Serbs may illustrate why, in 2014, a life-size statue and memorial to Princip was placed in a prominent East Sarajevo public park (see Figures 5-14 and 5-15).

### 5.3.1.2 A Low Emphasis on Inclusive Collective Memory

Corresponding to the high emphasis on separate identity group symbolism in the everyday, there is also an apparent low emphasis on common national cultural or historical memory (such as national museums or parks) as a mechanism for bridgebuilding and facilitating a broader, more inclusive collective shared memory as a counter-narrative to separate identity group narratives related to victimhood and separateness. According to one former senior BiH government official, pan-national monuments and symbols were both deliberately destroyed during the war (author interview, 25 September 2018) and the recent dedication of new ethnonational monuments in East Sarajevo is divisive now (author interview with senior NGO official, 28 September 2018).

Other examples include Bosnia-Herzegovina’s national museum’s struggle to receive operational funding in the national budget, a situation so impactive that it has resulted in the museum’s periodic closure (Harrington et al 2018, pgs. 148-149, 155). Also, another example is the apparent neglect of a public park dedicated to the national and collective victory in WW II (author interviews with residents of Sarajevo, 28 September and 12 November 2018). The park is located on the border of East Sarajevo and Sarajevo (see Figures 5-23 and 5-24) and is one of the few examples of an inclusive cultural or historical resource linked to a national identity in East Sarajevo or Sarajevo more generally.

### 5.3.1.3 Education Policy and “Two School Under One Roof”

The “Two Schools Under One Roof” policy (Bassi 2014, p. 39) where children of different identity group attend school in the same building but are fully physically segregated both in class instruction and socially is divisive but continues in BiH. As one senior NGO official explained, there is no state-level Ministry of Education “to even examine the wisdom of continuing this constitutionally-allowed practice” (author interview, 28 September 2018).
Outcomes of this segregationist approach are shown in the different interpretations of historical events which are adjusted to the prevailing cultural norms and narratives of the respective identity groups. As referenced previously, the “Choosing Peace Together” program, an intergroup peacebuilding initiative sponsored by Catholic Relief Services, provides one such example of how this policy reinforces different collective memories in new generations. With this policy “the Serb curriculum glorifies Gavrilo Princip as a liberator, while the Bosniak curriculum portrays him as the assassin of Archduke Ferdinand. The Ottoman era, meanwhile, is resented in the Bosniak curriculum as a time of prosperity and liberation, while for Serbs it is a dark period of occupation and backwardness” (Bolton 2017, p. 22).

Ironically, this policy was first introduced by the OSCE, though recent reporting from the OSCE is highly critical of this intended “temporary” approach. As of November 2018, no “Two Schools Under One Roof” program continued in Sarajevo, although some are ongoing outside the city (OSCE 2018, p. 6).

*I wish that my friends could go to school together. We get together, and we play together, until we have to go to school where we are separated in class.*

Fatima Kadić, Age 7, Sarajevo

| 2016: Do not share our nationality. |
| 2030: All children should go to school together. |

![Figure 5-4 Two Schools Under One Roof](image)

Source: Two Schools under One Roof Postcards from the Future (United Nations Country Team in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2016, n.p.)
5.3.1.4 Evidence of New Social-Spatial Developments that May Reduce Fragility

In addition to the previously identified factors which foster division between identity groups in East Sarajevo and Sarajevo, there is also evidence of positive developments that may reduce fragility.

For instance, several residents of Sarajevo described the increasing number of Bosniak Sarajevo residents who now live, or are considering living, in East Sarajevo. This is significant because as shown in the 2013 national census (see Figure 5-1) only a very small percentage of residents in East Sarajevo were identified as Bosniak and this shows intermixing in neighborhood space. The Sarajevo residents identified two main reasons for this development. One, the rent was less expensive in East Sarajevo and provided a higher standard of residence for the price and, two, East Sarajevo was more “family friendly” with more space for children to play and where it was so safe “you didn’t need to lock up your bike on the street” (author interviews 6 and 13 November 2018).

5.3.2 Social (Intergroup Linkages)

Interviews with respective residents of both East Sarajevo and Sarajevo also confirm high levels of daily everyday interactions among members of different identity groups. Whether going to East Sarajevo to purchase less expensive fuel or traveling to Sarajevo to sit in the cafés or large shopping malls within the city, individuals felt no social restrictions, barrier or discomfort to traveling to the “other’s” space (author interviews with local residents in East Sarajevo and Sarajevo, 8 to 14 November 2018). One noticeable commonality of all identified interactions among residents was that all interactions or linkages with members of the other city were conducted individually and informally. Intergroup institutions such as sports associations, school competitions or other organized activity involving residents from both cities were never cited as a reason for engaging or interacting with residents of the other city (ibid.).

The question of what formal approaches or initiatives were being taken by the municipal authorities of East Sarajevo and Sarajevo to facilitate intercity linkages was something I was interested in. During my interview with Mr. Ljubiša Ćosić, Mayor of East New Sarajevo, I had the opportunity to review the future urban development planning schema for Lukavica, East Sarajevo, the most populated area of the city. The design was comprehensive and included new developments for mixed-use areas for residential, commercial, cultural, and entertainment; education/schools; light industry; multi-generational recreation areas and parking areas. However, one conspicuous absence was the complete lack of public transportation infrastructure, leading me to conclude that fostering mobility links with the adjacent city of Sarajevo did not, at least from this example, appear to be a high planning priority for the city (13 November 2018).
5.3.2.1 The Role of Inter-Faith Dialogue in Fostering Bridgebuilding

At the present time, the social institution of religion seems to offer little institutional support to building bridges or fostering interactivity or cooperation among area residents. A long time Sarajevo-based senior civil society manager related that most residents affiliated with a religion and because religion is associated with ethnonational identity and not social or personal values, this continues to entrench divisions among identity groups. “Young people pick up identity trappings of religion, for example, praises such “inshallah” and “then using them as external identity markers” (author interview, 6 November 2018).

Another local civil society organization manager felt that in the greater Sarajevo metropolitan area, “interfaith efforts and dialogue is superficial.” Further emphasizing the point that local religious leaders were contributing to perpetuating local division and separation among area residents, the interviewee added that “some local religious actors work in alignment with ethnonationalist interests and political parties” and that even now “there is a huge need for interfaith dialogue” to foster bridge-building among different identity groups (author interview, 28 SEP 18). Other local NGO’s leaders agreed, with one stating that “during last month’s elections (Oct 18) some religious leaders made political endorsements and instructed followers not to vote for certain candidates” (author interview with senior civil society officials, 6 November 2018).

A local senior religious leader I interviewed substantiated the view that interfaith dialogue initiatives played a marginal role in facilitating bridgebuilding among identity groups. The senior leader went so far to say that while “the interfaith community among religious leaders is active in Sarajevo area, it is politically co-opted” and “that religious positions are often abused to serve selfish purposes.” However, the cleric was also quick to point out that even with the political co-opting of the religious leader “different communities get along and function in the daily life” (author interview with a senior academic and religious leader, 1 November 2018).

5.3.2.2 Evidence of New Developments that May Reduce Fragility

There is also a new shared initiative which builds on Sarajevo’s heritage as an Olympic City. The 2019 European Youth Olympic Festival, an international sporting event, will be held in February 2019 in both Sarajevo and East Sarajevo venues and is co-sponsored by both cities (see Figure 5-5). The 1984 Winter Olympics hosted by Sarajevo is considered a high-point in the city’s history by everyone (author interview with senior civil society manager, 6 November 2018) and events took place throughout present-day East Sarajevo and Sarajevo. From a collective memory perspective, the positive recollection and civic pride that residents have for the 1984 Winter Olympics provides one of the only identified inclusive, positive collective memories for all local identity groups.
The project represents a significant step in normalizing co-planning programming between the two cities at the municipal level, which in turn could lead to higher degrees of integrated planning regarding community recreation space, intercity mobility linkages, metropolitan area foreign direct investment and economic growth. On the other hand, and as Figure 5-6 indicates, the current initiative is also projected as a means of proclaiming each city’s “separateness,” perhaps the most realistic long-term outcome to be expected from the events and contexts of Sarajevo’s post-conflict recovery.

Figure 5-5 East Sarajevo and Sarajevo Co-Hosting of 2019 EYOF Event

Figure 5-6 Separate cities working together
5.3.3 Political (Governance)

Mayor Ljubiša Ćosic, Mayor of East New Sarajevo, emphasized that good local governance practices facilitate the inclusion of multi-stakeholder participation in the urban planning process (author interview, 13 November 2018). According to Mayor Ćosic, an iterative review and approval planning process involving local stakeholders including residents, local community groups, business associations, investors and city administrators is standard procedure for all urban development initiatives in the city (ibid.).

Perhaps it is somewhat ironic given Sarajevo’s initial post-conflict gravitation to physical reconstruction, the international community is now engaged in developing local governance initiatives. As one Sarajevo-based senior UNDP official explained, “the international community is now shifting assistance to the local level to support bottom-up development and to steer positive response” (author interview, 19 November 2018).

*We are Building Everything They Need Here*

Mayor Ćosic, mayor of East New Sarajevo

13 November 2018

The governance process appeared to be locally inclusive according to input from the respective current and former mayors of East Sarajevo and Sarajevo but also complicated given the complex government structure set up by the DPA. “The most complex government system that could be” (author interview with Sarajevo-based senior UNDP official, 19 November 2018). However, in contrast to this sense of local inclusiveness, residents in both cities expressed dissatisfaction with municipal governments efforts to improve the quality of life for city residents (author interviews with residents of East Sarajevo and Sarajevo on 6 and 11 to 14 November 2018). To provide further insight into this topic consider the following questions and responses from Mayor Ćosic and Mayor (former) Kupusović:

- **Author question to the former mayor of Sarajevo:** What type of analysis was conducted to determine and assess the needs of the residents of Sarajevo for a transition to peace and post-conflict recovery after Dayton?

- **Response from Mayor (former) Kupusović, former mayor of Sarajevo, on 8 November 2018:** “So, analysis through the spatial plans or local urban plans were conducted several times in last 20 or so years …, but results are, in my opinion, not so good – quality of life for the ordinary citizens of Sarajevo is not improving very much.”

- **Author question to the mayor of East New Sarajevo:** How does the Municipality identify and act upon resident’s needs?
• Response from Mayor Ćosic, mayor of East New Sarajevo, on 13 November 2018:
“We are building everything they need in East Sarajevo, so there is no need to go anywhere else, to go to Sarajevo.” As previously referenced, Mayor Ćosic was also very specific in that all urban planning and development activities went through a multi-step stakeholder review process before implementation, to include residents, neighborhood community groups, businesses, investors, local government officials, and civil society stakeholders.

Also, the outcomes of Sarajevo’s partition and population resettlement do not appear to be diminishing in the area of municipal administration. According to Mayor Ćosic, “it is a pity, but I do not have a relationship with my colleagues across the border (in Sarajevo) nor do my colleagues. If you ask me, I will be sincere and say it could be better. We have no communication” (author interview, Mayor of East New Sarajevo, 13 November 2018).

Based upon the limited data obtained in the case study, the governance processes for both cities appear to address local requirements. However, these processes do not appear geared to promote, or take advantage of, greater intercity cooperation in an effort to create intergroup social capital between the different identity group majorities associated with each city.

5.3.4 Economic

5.3.4.1 Duplication of Services (Social Contract)

Another visible outcome of Sarajevo’s post-conflict partition and population resettlement is the occurrence of duplicated, rather than integrated, infrastructure, services, and institutions in East Sarajevo and Sarajevo (such as universities, hospitals, city services, public transportation) which undermines integrated urban development and better efficiencies. For example, East Sarajevo’s new primary hospital and health care, which opened in October 2018, was named “Serbia”, as “a sign of gratitude“ to the country of Serbia for “its treatment of the citizens of the Sarajevo-Romanija region in the war and post-war period, as well as for the constant support and contribution in the education of healthcare workers from the region of East Sarajevo,” according to the Sarajevo Times (2018a, n.p.). East Sarajevo’s population is currently at 60,000, according to the city’s mayor (author interview, 13 NOV 18) although the medical center can support a population of 120,000 (Sarajevo Times, 2018a, n.p.). According to Allianz Insurance (2018, n.p), there are 5 existing Hospitals/Clinics in the city of Sarajevo, a system which, according to Transparency International (2018, p.1) is administered by Sebija Izetbegović, the spouse of the last Bosniak member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (as of November 2018).
5.3.4.2 Public and Private Sector Investments Create New “Common Ground”
Recreational Space Between East Sarajevo and Sarajevo

Counter to the duplication of services exemplified by the hospital placement in East Sarajevo and Sarajevo, other economic-related initiatives are improving both cities’ social contract with their respective residents. On Trebević Mountain, a nature area and ridgeline that lies along the border of East Sarajevo and Sarajevo, new cafés, restaurants, and recreational facilities such as mountain tobogganing and the rebuilt cable car line up and down the mountain (only just reopened in 2018 after being closed 26 years ago due to the conflict) are attracting residents from both cities in a “common space” (see Figure 5-29). For older Sarajevo residents this is particularly significant. During the siege of the city, attacks were levied on Sarajevo directly from this area (Busby 2018, n.p.). Today’s shared usage potentially indicates the overcoming of negative associations for Sarajevo residents and helps increase the mixing and interaction of residents from both East Sarajevo and Sarajevo (author interview with a resident of Sarajevo, 8 November 2018). The fact that private sector economic initiatives are driving the utilization of this space, inclusive for residents of both cities, also sets a positive example for future similar activity.

5.4 Meso Analysis: Neighborhood Scale: Lukavica (City of East Sarajevo) and Dobrinja (City of Sarajevo)

The Dobrinja neighborhood (see Figure 5-8) was initially developed in advance of the 1984 Winter Olympics and considered a high-quality place to live for local professionals and their families (author interview with Former Mayor of Sarajevo, 5 November 2018). The Dobrinja river, where the local area takes its name from, is lined with playgrounds and paved walkways on both sides and is heavily used by residents for exercise and recreation. The river flows from East Sarajevo territory throughout the length of the Dobrinja neighborhood, extending nearly two kilometers through the integrated housing complexes, retail, and recreation space that made the neighborhood so desirable when it was initially built in the 1980s. Referred to a “yuppie neighborhood” before the war by a resident in a 1993 Washington Post article (Rupert 1993, n.p.), Dobrinja was a mixed, multi-ethnic community that self-organized its survival during the siege (Hunt 2011, p. 4).

Lukavica, the East Sarajevo neighborhood which borders Dobrinja to the east (see Figures 5-8 and 5-9), is the most densely populated area of East Sarajevo (author interview with East Sarajevo mayor, Mr. Ljubiša Ćosic, 13 November 2018). It was developed on territory that was occupied by Bosnian Serb forces during the 1992 – 1996 siege of Sarajevo. After the partition of Sarajevo in early 2006, many displaced Bosnian Serbs relocated to the Lukavica area and today “about 70% of its inhabitants are resettled Bosnian Serbs” (Björkdahl 2018, p. 40). According to interviews with senior officials in both East Sarajevo (13 November 2018) and Sarajevo (10
November 2018), Bosnian Serbs came to East Sarajevo after the DPA “to feel safe” among their community. The main built-up areas are located a little over 1000 meters from the finalized border with Dobrinja, mainly behind a band of open space which runs along the boundary line separating East Sarajevo and Sarajevo (see Figure 5-20).

5.4.1 Physical and Environmental (Socio-Spatial)

*It is “not the well-publicized handshakes of national political elites, but rather the more mundane, but ultimately more meaningful, handshakes and smiles of ethnically diverse urban neighbors as they confront each other in their daily interactions and adventures”*

Scott Bollens 2006, p. 67

There are no physical barrier walls or checkpoints at the partition line dividing East Sarajevo and Sarajevo. The division (see Figure 8) is characterized by its “physical non-existence and apparent permeability” (Aquilué and Roca 2016, p. 154). A closer look at the adjacent border-neighborhoods of Dobrinja (Sarajevo) and Lukavica (East Sarajevo), however, shows immediate indications of separateness and differentiation on each side of the border. Some aspects are subtler such as large buffer zones of open, unused space along each side of the border (see Figures 5-20, 5-21 and 22). Other indicators are less so, such as the sign which welcomes visitors to East Sarajevo appearing only in Bosnia Serb Cyrillic and English, which seems to consciously exclude Bosniaks, the majority population of Sarajevo whose language is distinctly missing from the sign (see Figure 23), a dividing feature also highlighted in previous research by Aquilué and Roca (2016, p. 160). According to Dr. Tarik Kupusović, the former Mayor of Sarajevo, “the cultural border separating East Sarajevo and Sarajevo cannot be seen but is very much there” (author interview, 5 November 2018).

The exact border line itself was contested by both East Sarajevo and Sarajevo until 2001 when an Office of High Representative (OHR)-appointed judge ruled on the exact boundary separating the Lukavica and Dobrinja neighborhoods (Aquilué and Roca 2016, pg. 156). While the judge cited the DPA’s use of a poorly chosen map scale (1:600000) that provided an insufficient level of detail to discern the exact location of the border in an urban setting (ibid.), a former senior official of the BiH government contested this notion during an interview when he told me that “the border was known precisely by all at the end of the war. Later it was claimed that it was not specially laid out, but this was not true on the ground” (author interview, 7 November 2018). While the reasons for the border’s contestation may be questioned, the fact that post-conflict border between Lukavica and Dobrinja was contested for five years is not in dispute. The formally contested border space, established in Sarajevo’s favor as a result of the judge’s
arbitration, now contains a rebuilt elementary school, a newly built Catholic church, and refurbished apartments (see Figure 5-7 below).

5.4.1.1 Memorials and Symbolism

The Lukavica-Dobrinja border area represents one of the front lines of the siege of Sarajevo where some of the highest levels of violence occurred (Hunt 2011, p. 31). The majority of identified ethnonational associated memorials and symbolism in East Sarajevo and Sarajevo were located in the Lukavica and Dobrinja neighborhoods (see Figures 5-10 to 5-17). On both sides of the border memorials and symbolism such as murals reinforced the respective individual ethnonational identity group collective memory. Bosnian Serbs or Serbian in the case of Lukavica and Bosniak in the case of Dobrinja.

While in most cases the displayed memorials and symbolisms reinforced ethnonational narratives related to victimhood at the hand of others through successive generations, thus, at some level, preserving a separate identity and division, other displays were highly divisive. One example is the display of former Bosnian Serb military commander, Ratko Mladic, a Hague convicted war criminal who, at one time, oversaw the siege of Sarajevo, in the East Sarajevo city hall front window (see Figures 5-7 and 5-8). This display was sufficiently alienating enough to be questioned in local news media (Lakic 2018, n.p.). In Dobrinja, the memorials and symbolisms perpetuate Bosniak victimhood at the hands of Bosnian Serbs through memorials for victims of attacks in Dobrinja itself and with wall murals commemorating the victims of genocide in Srebrenica in 1995. In Lukavica, one can also see the East Sarajevo city coat of arms (see Figure 5-13) that conveys “Serb history and traditions” (Björkdahl 2018, p. 39) and contains the East
Sarajevo flag and Republika Srpska entity flag while leaving out the Bosnia-Herzegovina national flag.

The transgenerational transfer of ethnonational collective memory is also facilitated through the placement of a memorial and mural of Serbian nationalist, Gavrilo Princip, among the sports field and children’s’ playground in Lukavica’s central park (see Figures 5-14 and 5-15).

5.4.1.2 Mobility Linkages

Automobiles. Automobile traffic between both Lukavica and Dobrinja was consistently active during observations conducted throughout the day and in the evening. Most vehicle traffic utilized the main transit thoroughfare located at the northern side of each neighborhood (see Figure 5-8). Both Lukavica and Dobrinja featured numerous parking lots linked to retail and multi-use area with paid on-street parking. One resident stated that it was necessary to have a car to get around and function in Sarajevo (field notes 1 November 2018) and in resident interviews most respondents from both East Sarajevo and Sarajevo specified a car as their primary means of transport between the cities (author interviews in East Sarajevo and Sarajevo, 1 to 14 November 2018).

Public transportation. The East Sarajevo municipal bus station in Lukavica and the Sarajevo tram and bus terminus in Dobrinja are located approximately 400 meters from each other on the same street on each side of the border (See Figure 5-8). They do not connect, nor are their operations integrated though they are located nearly next to each other (author interview with local resident # 6 of East Sarajevo, 12 November 2018). In previous field research, Jansen noted that “all vehicles in the west and most in the east leave in the direction away from the border” in describing the lack of public transport linkages between the two adjacent cities (2013, p.31).

According to one resident from East Sarajevo, the bus schedule at the East Sarajevo is not responsive to residents’ needs, “but people just accept this.” For example, on any given day there are multiple buses departing the East Sarajevo bus station for Belgrade, Serbia yet there are only a few daily departures for Sarajevo, where most people want to go for work or shopping (author interview # 5, 12 November 2018). Others feel that they can simply walk or drive the short distance across the border to Dobrinja to pick up the tram to travel into Sarajevo and low public transportation linkages between the cities is not a barrier or disincentive to travel there, although there is a distinct awareness of crossing the border (author interviews with residents # 2, #4, # 5 of East Sarajevo, 12 November 2018). For the most part, local Sarajevo residents who traveled into East Sarajevo did not use public transportation citing its infrequency, complicated nature of transfers and switching cars, and the high expense of the required multiple tickets (author interview with resident # 1, # 4, #5 of Sarajevo, 12 and 13 November 2018). One respondent from Sarajevo said that he “would probably go to East Sarajevo more often if the public
transportation system was better” (author interview resident # 5 of Sarajevo on 13 November 2018). Other Sarajevo residents cited the high expense of taking public transportation from Sarajevo to East Sarajevo (author interview 28 September 2018).

**Taxies.** Taxies from one city are not allowed to operate in the other city and only do so illegally (author interview with Sarajevo resident, 28 September 2018.) Another resident described how taxi drivers from either city would stop and remove the taxi sign from the roof before entering the other city (author interview with resident #3 of Sarajevo, 12 November 2018), a process also confirmed and described by Björkdahl (2018, p. 40).

**Pedestrian foot traffic.** Going east, the main thoroughfare for foot traffic between Dobrinja and Lukavica passes directly in front of the respective city’s bus/tram and bus stations (see Figure 5-9) before entering an boundary open space area with some partially built building construction but mostly just open space which separates the main built-up areas and multi-use space of Lukavica with the multi-use built-up space of Dobrinja (see Figure 5-20). Informal footpaths also exist across the open space towards the Catholic church located just over the boundary line in Dobrinja (see Figure 5-7) although most of the observed foot traffic during several field visits to the site (from 28 October to 14 November 2018) occurred on the sidewalk of the main thoroughfare. During the day pedestrian traffic on the thorough sidewalk was active and constant and generally seemed to flow to and from Lukavica to the Sarajevo tram and bus terminal.

**Bicycle traffic.** As part of the research, I utilized a bicycle to use and assess bicycle traffic patterns between Lukavica and Dobrinja. Low levels of bicycle use by residents were observed within both neighborhoods but not between them. Also, although each neighborhood had formal bike lanes on internal road networks, none were observed that connected both neighborhoods (participant observation Dobrinja and Lukavica, 3 November 2018). Of note, in only one instance (1 out 16 local resident interviews) was a bicycle identified as an individual’s primary means of transit between the two neighborhoods during local resident interviews.
5.4.1.3 Spatial Depiction of the Neighborhoods and Border Areas of Lukavica and Dobrinja

Partition Border Area of Dobrinja (City of Sarajevo) and Lukavica (City of East Sarajevo).

Figure 5-8 Large View of Partition Border Area

Figure 5-9 Close in View of Partition Border Area
5.4.2 Political (Governance)

A local UNDP development official communicated that more focus is now being placed on bottom-up development and local governance, specifically to programs that foster reconciliation. “The attention to the local level is growing in support of peacebuilding and reconciliation programs” (author interview with Sarajevo-based senior UNDP official, 19 November 2018).

While Mayor Ćosic, mayor of East New Sarajevo, made no mention of this during his interview, there is some evidence for new cross border initiatives in the Lukavica / Dobrinja neighborhoods. The existence of shared cross-border greenspace and mobility planning efforts by the Canton of Sarajevo shows the potential for better linkages between the cross-border neighborhoods of Dobrinja (Sarajevo) and Lukavica (East Sarajevo). While no municipal officials discussed their awareness of any such plans in interviews, published reports from the London School of Economics (LSE 2014, p. 34) show the existence of plans for a public green space and tram line that features a mixed-use design that integrates the East Sarajevo-Sarajevo border area at the residential level (see Figure 5-30). While no physical evidence exists at the neighborhood scale to suggest implementation of these plans, the fact that they exist at all suggests an eventual realization of improved access to and between the respective cities, softening some of the physical and social constructs (see Figures 5-10 to 5-17; 5-20 to 5-22) that currently define the border space.

5.4.3 Economic

No evidence was obtained that reflected an unwillingness among residents to participate in cross-border economic activity. To the contrary, in local interviews with Sarajevo residents, all but 1 (8 out of 9), stated that they went to East Sarajevo for shopping or dining out. Likewise, among East Sarajevo residents (7 out of 7) all stated that they went to Sarajevo for shopping or dining out. Motivations for each group, however, were generally different. Sarajevo residents stated that they were attracted to lower prices and recreation opportunities in East Sarajevo. East Sarajevo residents valued the diversity of places to go and better selection of retail goods in Sarajevo (author interviews 6 to 14 November 2018).

5.5 Urban Imagery Relevant to Current Socio-Spatial Context in Sarajevo and East Sarajevo

Posters of former Bosnian Serb military commander, Ratko Mladic, a convicted war criminal, are publicly displayed in the East Sarajevo City Hall. In the left image, a closer view shows the Serbian national colors superimposed over the shape of the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Bosnian Serb Orthodox Church center on the East Sarajevo – Sarajevo Border with checkerboard recreation space, a symbol of town center and similar to the one in Independence Square, Sarajevo (as noted in previous research by Bădescu 2015, p. 42).

Source: Author, November 2018

East Sarajevo coat of arms showing East Sarajevo flag (right) and Republika Srpska entity flag (left) but no Bosnia-Herzegovina national flag. Source: Author, November 2018
Statue (left) and wall mural (right) of Serbian nationalist, Gavrilo Princip, in East Sarajevo city park of same name. In 1914, Princip assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary in Sarajevo precipitating World War I.

Wall mural in Sarajevo Dobrinja border area. “Never forget Srebrenica.” In 1995, an estimated 8,000 Bosniaks were killed by Bosnian Serb forces in the area of Srebrenica.
Memorial in Sarajevo Dobrinja border area commemorating deaths of residents during siege of Sarajevo. Source: Author, November 2018

Figure 5-17 Victims' memorial in border area (Sarajevo)

Figure 5-18 Wall memorial in Grbavica
Wall mural memorializing the victims of Srebrenica in Sarajevo’s Grbavica area. During the siege of Sarajevo, Grbavica was largely controlled by Bosnian Serb Forces.

Source: Author, November 2018

Figure 5-19 Wall mural of Palestinian Flag in Grbavica (Sarajevo)
Wall mural of the Palestinian flag in Sarajevo’s Grbavica area. “The Maniacs” may be a reference to a local football team.

Source: Author, October 2018

Figure 5-20 East Sarajevo border area
East Sarajevo “buffer” space with grazing sheep between built up areas along the urban border of East Sarajevo and Sarajevo.

Source: Author, November 2018

Figure 5-21 Sarajevo border area
Sarajevo “buffer” space with ruins between built up areas along the urban border of Sarajevo and East Sarajevo.
Figure 5-22 Republika Srpska welcome sign on East Sarajevo-Sarajevo border

Figure 5-23 Close in views of entrance stairs of Vraca Memorial Park located on the East Sarajevo and Sarajevo border

Figure 5-24 Neglected Vraca Memorial Park located directly on the East Sarajevo and Sarajevo border

Figure 5-25 “Sarajevo Roses”
External Assistance Per Capita During Initial Post-Conflict Period

Figure 5-26 Initial external post-conflict assistance per capita

![Graph showing external assistance per capita for various countries during the initial post-conflict period.](image)

Source: Dobbins et al. 2003, p. xviii

Figure 5-27 Post-conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration budgets per capita

![Graph showing post-conflict disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration budgets per capita for various countries.](image)

Source: Muggah 2009, p. 8
Residents from both cities enjoying recreation facilities in the shared border space of Trebević Mountain located between East Sarajevo and Sarajevo.
Figure 5-30 Evidence of planning for cross-border greenspace and mobility networks by the Canton of Sarajevo

Source: London School of Economics 2014, p. 34
6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Conclusions

6.1.1 General Research Question

*Working as part of an international post-conflict intervention effort, how can urban planners contribute to achieving better long-term outcomes of peace and stability in the urban post-conflict setting?*

Urban post-conflict recovery approaches must be contextually appropriate. Thesis findings show that Sarajevo’s post-conflict context was ill-suited for a “liberal peace” recovery strategy with a rapid market and political transition. Government institutions were insufficiently developed at every level. As a former senior BiH official involved in the recovery effort related in his interview, local and national institutions were nowhere near ready to take on the governance functions expected of them in 1996. As noted in the Key Findings and Analysis chapter, the need for sufficient governmental capacity as a precursor to the “liberal peace” approach is emphasized by several academic researchers.

Sarajevo’s experiences demonstrate that a non-holistic reconstruction focus to the restoration of essential services and physical infrastructure can also translate to neglected social recovery efforts. As NATO reporting from the period tells us, the focus to physical reconstruction planning was deep-rooted, commencing in March 1994, nearly two years before the ending of the intrastate armed conflict. While infrastructure and restoration of services is an essential post-conflict task, a more holistic multi-sector area-based approach, as recently proposed by both the IIED and ALNAP, acknowledges that post-conflict recovery is an interdependent process involving physical infrastructure restoration, institutional development, and social recovery.

The partitioning of Sarajevo by the IEBL and the subsequent resettlement of individuals in East Sarajevo (RS) and Sarajevo (FBiH) along ethnonational lines is one of the most significant consequences to come from the DPA. At both the municipal and neighborhood scale, its effects continue to define and shape the greater Sarajevo metropolitan area to the present. However, other examples of intrastate post-conflict recovery approaches do exist where the post-conflict partitioning and separation of polarized identity groups was not the path taken.

In post-conflict Sarajevo, “small-steps” intergroup engagement and interaction required for social recovery process were lacking. Again, as presented in Chapter 5, the rush to elections in 1996 allowed insufficient time for grassroots democracy to develop, resulting in the wartime ethnonational parties becoming the de facto political establishment parties overnight and effectively institutionalizing wartime division choices as the only political option (Paris 2004,
pgs.101-103) in the process. In turn, this led to the hardening of local political party resolve for the partitioning and long-term separation – rather than reconciliation – of the ethnonational communities. Given the lack of political will, and absent a socio-spatial strategy designed to foster intergroup linkages and social recovery, entrenched separation along ethnonational lines was the result. This level of segregation was unfortunate as how different identity groups work together horizontally has a crucial effect on how the vertical state-society social contract develops.

While a more integrated and balanced physical, institutional, and social recovery strategy for urban post-conflict interventions is but one of many factors which determine far-reaching outcomes of an urban post-conflict context, it is a critical one. There are no “one-size-fits-all” approaches given the highly contextualized nature of both the urban dimension and the changed nature of armed conflict. As the data presented in Chapter 2 literature review shows, it is this recognition which is fueling new approaches to urban post-conflict interventions, one of which is the call for more strategic governance frameworks to coordinate post-conflict interventions efforts in a more integrated fashion in step with the increased density, diversity, complexities, quantities and opportunities of the urban space (ODI 2018, n.p).

Relatedly, new post-conflict conceptual frameworks, such as the one recently developed by Sakalasuriya et al (2018, p. 894), are also emerging as part of the broader call for a more strategic governance framework to orchestrating more integrated, area-based and locally-inclusive post-conflict neighborhood interventions that foster the creation of social capital and the (re)establishment of the social contract at the municipal level. Conceptual frameworks such as this allow locals and internationals alike to develop a common understanding of both the local context and the potential positive or negatives outcomes of possible intervention activities.

6.1.2 Specific Research Questions

*Which of Sarajevo’s post-conflict reconstruction methods and approaches might inform other current or future urban post-conflict intervention efforts?*

Spatial partitioning of polarized groups as an urban post-conflict strategy equates to poor long-term outcomes. Urban researcher Elena Bassi concludes in her 2013 analysis of Sarajevo, “barriers and spatial partitions introduced to deal with inter-group tensions and violence represent a poor resolving strategy entailing deep and long-lasting consequences in terms of social encounter and exchange” (2013, p. 5) – a hypothesis validated by the results and findings of this case study.

Entrenched separateness contributes to the perpetuation of fragility in the post-conflict city. In the post-conflict fragile context, “social divisions and weak institutions” are the norm.
and “society tends to be fractured into various groups that are often based on ethnic, religious, clan, or other identity” (OECD 2018, p. 42). The OECD argues that how these identity groups cooperate and work together horizontally have a key effect on how the vertical state-society social contract develop (ibid., p. 42). In this type of situation where trust is absent, fragility “rises or declines with the ability of such groups to work together” (ibid., p. 42). In Sarajevo, entrenched separateness is exhibited through:

- A political patronage system (as shown by the hospital system) (Transparency International 2018, p.1);
- No day-to-day working system between the respective cities (East Sarajevo and Sarajevo (author interview with Mayor of East New Sarajevo 13 NOV 18);
- and,
- Perceived state capture and political corruption (field notes from discussion with local resident of Sarajevo, 25 September 2018).

**Urban post-conflict recovery requires a more integrated approach involving physical, institutional and social recovery components.** Physical infrastructure reconstruction is but one factor in urban post-conflict recovery. In Sarajevo, it was not only institutional development that was cited as receiving insufficient attention by the international community. Inadequate social recovery programming was also referenced in interviews as a shortcoming of the recovery effort. In one local interview with a long-serving OSCE official in Sarajevo, the individual informed me that “people never got proper help in Sarajevo - and they still have PTSD” (author interview with OSCE official, 27 September 2018).

It is for reasons such as this that post-conflict reconstruction specialists argue that post-conflict recovery is an interdependent process involving some form of physical infrastructure restoration, institutional development, and social recovery (Martin-Díaz 2014, p. 306; Barakat 2010, p. 11; Lamphere-Englund 2015, pgs. 31-33).

**The roles of values-based and common cultural institutions in promoting trust building and reconciliation in diverse urban post-conflict settings are underdeveloped.**

The role of values-based religious institutions and other cultural institutions such as museums for intergroup dialogue, reconciliation and the reestablishment of inclusive collective memory could be expanded and built upon. Research shows numerous examples of prominently displaced symbols, memorials and imagery explicitly linked to individual identity groups (see section 5.3.4) but, comparatively, a minimal emphasis for a collective, inclusive culture and identity.
Do current socio-spatial conditions in East Sarajevo and Sarajevo perpetuate urban fragility in the greater Sarajevo metropolitan area?

Sarajevo received significant levels of international assistance for post-conflict reconstruction (See Figure 5-26). The international post-conflict intervention effort focused primarily on physical infrastructure reconstruction activities, fostering near term market and political liberalization processes (Bollens 2006, p. 100) (Paris 2004, pgs. 99-100) and implementation of the IEBL, which partitioned the country and city along ethnonational lines. These efforts did not adequately address – and arguably have contributed to – the underlying root social and political/ethnonational structural factors that contribute to the underlying tensions that perpetuate Sarajevo’s urban fragility to this day.

This thesis concludes that meso level findings show that Sarajevo currently remains a contested space in the political and cultural institutional level with tensions existing less at the individual everyday interaction level and more at the respective identity group collective memory and public sector institutional levels. Ethnonational identity divisions were frozen at the conflict’s end and only further entrenched in time with post-conflict political policies and activities.

Indeed, as the data shows, more than two decades after the signing of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, the greater metropolitan area of Sarajevo remains a post-conflict environment (Pilav 2012, p. 33). Still, new shared economic and recreational initiatives related to the development of “common ground” space between East Sarajevo and Sarajevo on Trebević mountain, and the East Sarajevo and Sarajevo 2019 co-hosting of the EYOF winter festival, which brings a revival of the inclusive collective memory and common heritage associated with Sarajevo’s status as an Olympic City, show some promise for improving intergroup linkages and social capital.

While there is no evidence that the outcomes of Sarajevo’s post-conflict recovery specific approaches (partitioning, population resettlement, rapid political & market liberalization, and a predominant focus to physical reconstruction over social recovery) directly perpetuate urban fragility in Sarajevo today, each of these factors set the conditions which contribute to its assessed higher level of urban fragility in the present.

The findings of this thesis suggest that the earlier integration and use of urban planners with initial urban post-conflict intervention efforts could have resulted in better foundational intergroup spatial strategies, policies and approaches essential for setting the conditions for improved social recovery through intergroup linkages and, over time, reconciliation and the building of social capital, leading, in turn, to better long-term outcomes of urban peace and stability today.
6.2 Recommendations

**Continue the discussion for a more integrated urban post-conflict strategic governance framework.** International and national-level post-conflict response organizations should conduct additional multistakeholder (i.e. humanitarian relief and recovery NGOs, other civil society, government agencies, international and multilateral lateral organizations, NATO, academia and practitioners) discussions on a more integrated urban post-conflict strategic governance framework, to include the use and integration of urban planning technical expertise, a technical skill not frequently integrated with urban post-conflict humanitarian and stabilization first response efforts. The GAUC might facilitate such an initiative with international or national level donor support.

**Conduct additional research on the urban post-conflict setting.** Research institutions, perhaps working through a UN or regional relief and recovery agencies, should expand the theoretical basis of urban post-conflict recovery by promoting the gathering of additional empirical data from other recent urban armed conflicts (Sana'a, Mosul, Raqqa, etc.).

**Integrate urban planners into initial urban post-conflict recovery intervention efforts.**
Given the changed nature of armed conflict and the changing nature of urban post-conflict recovery, post-conflict intervention efforts should integrate and prioritize urban planning expertise into initial recovery efforts to help foster the socio-spatial conditions that contribute to better outcomes that minimize the potential for conflict reversion and promote urban stability. Spatial viewpoints can open up new initiatives for intergroup interactions and linkages, livelihood opportunities, neighborhood clustering and social capital development.

**Urban post-conflict interventions should operate from the "The Golden Hour" Principle.**
Strengthening local governance and establishing or rebuilding the municipal capacity to deliver on the social contract takes time, but in an urban post-conflict situation a traumatized local population needs to see improvements quickly if they are to keep faith with the local government. In situations when armed non-state actors may be competing with the local government by offering their version of a social contract this is particularly important. As James Stephenson, former USAID mission director for Iraq, puts it, “unless the population senses steadily improving conditions in that first year, popular support for change and whomever is in charge declines, and the chances for economic, political, and social transformation begin to evaporate, enabling recidivism and even insurgencies” (Stephenson 2007, p. 36).

**Foster the creation of social capital through “small step” economic and recreation linkages as part of “common ground” strategies.** As Sarajevo shows in the case of post-conflict neighborhoods of Dobrinja or Grbavica, in the initial period of urban post-conflict recovery, polarized groups may occupy adjacent neighborhoods. Previous incidents of violence, longstanding grievances, or real or perceived injustices on the part of the “other” community are not
forgotten overnight and spatial division among identity group is a result. Accordingly, social recovery within and between spatially segregated identity group communities takes time. Yet, as the post-conflict recovery strategy in Rwanda shows, an integrated socio-spatial recovery strategy can mitigate conflict by focusing on the long-term development of social capital through “small step” economic linkages as part of “common ground” strategies that foster intergroup interaction, cooperation, and, potentially, the eventual linking and bridging of different communities. By focusing on creating the longer-term conditions necessary to foster the development of social capital networks inside and among different identity groups with the city, cities strengthen the social contract through increased trust and stability among communities.
References


Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Oslo


Muggah, R. (2016): These are the World’s Most Fragile Cities – and This Is How They Can Turn Things Around In: *World Economic Forum 15 September 2016*


Annex A: Distribution of Ethnonational Identity Groups in the Greater Sarajevo Metropolitan Areas (2013 National Census)
**Annex B: List of Case Study Interviewees (East Sarajevo and Sarajevo)**

List of Case Study Interviewees – East Sarajevo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Location of Interview</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Current Occupation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lukavica (East Sarajevo)</td>
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<td>21</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Lukavica (East Sarajevo)</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>East Sarajevo</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lukavica (East Sarajevo)</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>East Sarajevo</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lukavica (East Sarajevo)</td>
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<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Pale (East Sarajevo)</td>
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List of Case Study Interviews – Sarajevo

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<th>Location of Interview</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Current Occupation</th>
</tr>
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<td>Sarajevo</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Ilidza (Sarajevo)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Dobrinja (Sarajevo)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Novo Sarajevo (Sarajevo)</td>
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<td>Sarajevo</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Centar (Sarajevo)</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>Sarajevo</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Novo Sarajevo (Sarajevo)</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Sarajevo</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
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<td>Sarajevo</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ilidza (Sarajevo)</td>
<td>M</td>
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<td>Student</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex C: Local Resident Individual Questions

James Schmitt
Technical University - Berlin
Questions for Individual Residents

Questions for Individual Residents (Sarajevo and East Sarajevo)

1. Introduction

   o Make introductions, provide the purpose of the academic research and ask if individual is willing to take part in an academic survey.

   o Explain that all information will be kept private, anonymous, and used solely as part of a larger academic research effort related to urban planning in post-conflict cities. It is important to note the gender and age of each respondent.

2. Frequency and Purpose of Travel to Sarajevo and East Sarajevo (or Vice Versa)

   1. How long have you lived in Sarajevo (or East Sarajevo)?
   2. How often do you travel to from East Sarajevo to Sarajevo (or vice versa)?
   3. Why do you travel there (job, shopping, sports, culture, recreation)?
   4. In general, what is the most important reason for people to travel from East Sarajevo to Sarajevo (or vice versa)?
   5. How do you travel there? (taxi, car, bike, walking, public transportation)? Is it easy or not that easy to get there?

3. Perceptions of Sarajevo and East Sarajevo

   6. Would you rather live in Sarajevo or East Sarajevo? Why?
   7. How are the cities different and why?
   8. As a resident of East Sarajevo, what areas do you most frequently go to in Sarajevo (or vice versa)?
   9. Are there are any places in East Sarajevo where people from Sarajevo (or vice versa) do not feel welcome? If so, why do you think that is?
   10. In general, does it matter that Sarajevo and East Sarajevo are two separate cities? Why or why not?
## Annex D: Responses to Case Study Structured Interviews

### Survey Questions 1 – 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Questions</th>
<th>East Sarajevo</th>
<th>Sarajevo</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How long have you lived in Sarajevo (or East Sarajevo)?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 2 Years</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 - 9 Years</td>
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<tr>
<td>&gt; 10 Years</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; Once a Week</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Once a Week</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
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<td>33%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Why do you travel there (job, shopping, sports, culture, social/recreation)?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social/Recreation</td>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports/Mountains</td>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Don't</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In general, what is the most important reason for people to travel from East Sarajevo to Sarajevo (or vice versa)?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
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<td>33%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social/Recreation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better Standard of Living/More Economic Opportunities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How do you travel there? (taxi, car, bike, walking, public transportation)? Is it easy or not that easy to get there?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Taxi</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Transportation (Bus or Tram)</td>
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<td>100%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bike</td>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walking</td>
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## Survey Questions 6 – 10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Questions</th>
<th><strong>East Sarajevo</strong></th>
<th><strong>Sarajevo</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Survey Questions</strong></td>
<td><strong>M</strong></td>
<td><strong>F</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you rather live in Sarajevo or East Sarajevo? Why?</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Sarajevo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarajevo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn’t Matter</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How are the cities different and why?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarajevo has More Social and Economic Offerings</td>
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<td>Sarajevo is Very Crowded; East Sarajevo is Not</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Sarajevo is Less Hectic; Greater Trust</td>
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<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarajevo has More Cultural Offerings</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Sarajevo is not really a city - just a place for Serb people to feel safe</td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a resident of East Sarajevo, what areas do you most frequently go to in Sarajevo (or vice versa)?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping Malls / City Center</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Historical Areas (Old Town)</td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountains</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cafés/Clubs</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there any places in East Sarajevo where people from Sarajevo (or vice versa) do not feel welcome? If so, why do you think that is?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
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<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Sure / Possible Areas of Tension</td>
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<td>In general, does it matter that Sarajevo and East Sarajevo are two separate cities? Why or why not?</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex E: Municipality Administrator Questions

James Schnitt
Technical University - Berlin
Questions for Municipal Officials

7 November 2018

Questions for Municipality Officials (Urban Planning and Management)

Note: All information provided as part of this questionnaire is to be kept private, anonymous, and used solely as part of a larger academic research effort related to urban planning in post-conflict cities.

1. Urban Planning and Administration

Objective: To understand how urban planning is conducted and prioritized at the individual municipality level.

1. Within your municipality, how does the urban planning process work, and how does this process integrate into the overall city planning process?

2. Does the municipality have an urban development plan? Why or why not?

3. Which stakeholders are involved in the urban planning process:
   a. citizens groups
   b. NGOs
   c. Private Investors and Companies
   d. Elected Officials
   e. Others

4. How does the municipality prioritize, plan, and implement for the following urban infrastructures and services:
   a. Gas, Electricity, Water, Trash Removal, Sewage Treatment
   b. Public Recreation and Well Being
      i. Parks, Meeting Areas, Libraries, Community and Youth Centers
   c. Public Transportation
   d. Community Safety and Security
   e. Building Construction

5. How are different stakeholders involved in each of the above category?

6. Are transportation and other resident needs coordinated with adjacent municipality or city administrators?

7. Does the municipality co-manage the provision of any community services with other municipalities? With commercial vendors?

8. Is urban planning intended to foster integration and cooperation between different identity groups within the greater Sarajevo metropolitan region? Why or why not?

9. How are municipal services paid for (Taxation, External Funding From City or Canton, Grants, Private Investors, Commercial Partnerships)?
2. **Identifying and Acting Upon Residents’ Needs and Requirements**

*Objective:* To understand how municipal officials identify and act upon resident needs. To understand the extent of urban planning and management coordination and cooperation between Sarajevo and East Sarajevo.

10. How does the Municipality identify and act upon resident’s needs? Do these needs provide direction for the Municipality’s urban planning process? If so, how? If not, why not?

11. Do different municipalities in Sarajevo and East Sarajevo coordinate and work together?

12. How would you describe the working relationship between municipal administrators in Sarajevo and East Sarajevo? Has this relationship changed over time? If so, what are some of reasons for this change?

13. Are there any common projects or programs between different municipalities in Sarajevo and East Sarajevo?

14. Are there any infrastructure or services jointly planned or administered by the two cities? If so, which ones?
Annex F: Key Considerations: Quick Response Providers for Cities Recovering from Crisis

From urban crisis response in the city of New Orleans in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. While developed for private sector urban crisis first responders in early 2006, these approaches remain an applicable reference for most first response practitioners in the urban post-conflict space:

1. Know the history and context of the city.
2. Understand and empathize with those afflicted by the crisis.
3. Understand the dynamics of your operational environment.
4. Understand stakeholders in impacted neighborhoods.
5. Understand the concept of go and no-go areas.
6. Expect the unexpected.
7. Understand the city’s needs and requirements – anticipate.
8. Understand that change occurs hourly - not daily.
9. Crisis is a 24-hour business – manage resources in kind.
10. Understand that there will be a variety of all stakeholders.
12. Plan for austerity – impact on power and communication.